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Title VII and the Unenvisaged Case: Is Anti-LGBTQ
Discrimination Unlawful Sex Discrimination?
RONALD TURNER*
This Article examines recent circuit-split-creating federal appeals courts’ decisions
interpreting and applying Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964’s prohibition of
sex discrimination in unenvisaged cases presenting an issue not contemplated by the
United States Congress when it enacted the statute: is anti-LGBTQ discrimination
unlawful sex discrimination? Whether sexual-orientation discrimination constitutes
sex discrimination has been answered in the affirmative by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College of
Indiana and the Second Circuit in Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., and in the negative
by the Eleventh Circuit in Bostock v. Clayton County Board of Education. In EEOC
v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., the Sixth Circuit held that a plaintiff
could pursue her transgender-discrimination-is-sex-discrimination claim;
thereafter, the Fifth Circuit’s Wittmer v. Phillips 66 Company decision held that
binding circuit precedent foreclosed such an action.
This Article discusses the interpretive approaches chosen and applied by courts
and individual judges in recognizing or rejecting Title VII anti-LGBTQ
discrimination claims, with special reference to (1) the meaning of Title VII’s
“because of sex” prohibition, (2) the Supreme Court’s and circuit courts’
construction of the sex discrimination provision in the context of sex stereotyping
and gender nonconformity discrimination as applied to the anti-LGBTQ
discrimination question, and (3) associational discrimination theory. This Article
concludes that judicial recognition of anti-LGBTQ claims best comports with Title
VII’s sex discrimination ban as interpreted over the years by the Supreme Court and
more recently in Hively, Zarda, and R.G. & G.R. Funeral Homes. Is anti-LGBTQ
discrimination unlawful sex discrimination? Yes.
INTRODUCTION
The year is 1964. The United States Congress has enacted the Civil Rights Act, a
landmark statute that includes in Title VII a ban on employment discrimination
because of race, color, religion, national origin, and a last-minute addition to the
statutory text: sex.1 In the years and decades following the passage of Title VII, the
United States Supreme Court has interpreted and applied the sex discrimination ban
in a number of contexts involving allegations that certain employer practices and
conduct unlawfully discriminated against individuals on the basis of sex, such as
employer policies denying employment to women with pre-school-age children,
requiring women to make higher pension plan contributions than men, and providing
pregnancy-related hospitalization benefits to female employees but not female

* A.A. White Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center. J.D. University of
Pennsylvania Law School; B.A. Wilberforce University.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012); see infra Part I.
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spouses of male employees.2 The Court has also held that workplace sexual
harassment, including male-on-male harassment, violates Title VII and that
discrimination against an employee because she did not conform to the employer’s
gender stereotypes is sex-based discrimination prohibited by the statute. 3
The year is 2017. In Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College of Indiana, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, addressed and
answered in the affirmative the question whether Title VII’s sex discrimination
proscription encompasses sexual-orientation discrimination. 4 The next year, the
Second Circuit, in its en banc decision in Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc.,5 held that
sexual-orientation discrimination is a function of, and therefore discriminates on the
basis of, sex. Shortly thereafter, in EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes,
Inc,6 the Sixth Circuit ruled that a plaintiff could pursue her Title VII transgender
discrimination against her employer. Two months later, in Bostock v. Clayton County
Board of Commissioners,7 the Eleventh Circuit held that Title VII does not prohibit
sexual-orientation discrimination. And most recently, the Fifth Circuit’s Wittmer v.
Phillips 66 Company decision held that 1979 circuit precedent foreclosed Title VII
sexual-orientation discrimination claims.8
This Article examines the aforementioned circuit-split-creating decisions’
interpretations and applications of Title VII’s “because of sex” provision in
unenvisaged cases presenting an issue not anticipated by the 88th Congress when it
enacted Title VII in 1964: does Title VII prohibit anti-LGTBQ discrimination? An
unenvisaged case arises when a statute enacted to address and regulate a particular
subject is said to apply to another subject not considered or foreseen by the enacting
legislature. In the words of H.L.A. Hart, a legislature’s “inability to anticipate brings
with it a relative indeterminacy of aim.” 9 Unlike the “paradigm, clear cases” in which
the legislative aim “is so far determinate because we have made a certain choice,”
the aim in the unenvisaged case is indeterminate as “[w]e have not settled, because
we have not anticipated, the question which will be raised by the unenvisaged case
when it occurs . . . .”10 When that case arises, “we confront the issues at stake and
can then settle the question by choosing between the competing interests in the way
which best satisfies us,” thereby settling the question “as to the meaning, for the
purposes of this rule, of a general word.”11
In performing this settlement function in the “age of statutes,” 12 the federal
judiciary has selected from a menu of interpretive options and methodologies,

2. See infra Section I.A.
3. See infra Sections I.B, I.C.
4. 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
5. 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018) (en banc).
6. 884 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2018).
7. 723 Fed. App’x 964 (11th Cir. 2018) (per curiam), reh’g en banc denied, 894 F.3d
1335 (11th Cir. 2018).
8. 915 F.3d 328 (5th Cir. 2019).
9. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 128 (3d ed. 2012).
10. Id. at 129.
11. Id.
12. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUES (1982)
(stating that the American legal system has fundamentally changed to a system primarily
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including intentionalism, purposivism, textualism, and deference to administrative
agencies. A judge’s selection is of obvious importance to the analyses of and the
outcomes reached in cases. Hence the perennial question: how should judges decide
cases in which parties contest the meaning of a statute? Should judges “look within
the statute they interpret and outside it” and “turn to legal understandings that precede
the statute, postdate it, and coincide with its enactment” and “draw on overarching,
abstract principles”?13 Or should the judicial search for a, or the, meaning of the atissue text be restricted to then extant sources at the time of the statute’s enactment?
As discussed herein, courts and individual judges recognizing or not finding
actionable Title VII anti-LGBTQ14 claims have offered different rationales in support
of their conflicting positions, including three justifications discussed in this project:
(1) the meaning of Title VII’s “because of sex” prohibition, (2) the Supreme Court’s
and circuit courts’ construction of the “because of sex” provision in the context of
sex stereotyping and gender nonconformity discrimination as applied to the antiLGBTQ question, and (3) associational discrimination theory. Claim-recognizing
jurists have looked to Title VII’s text, Supreme Court and circuit court precedent,
and the views of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in
supporting their position. Those rejecting the argument that Title VII covers antiLGBTQ discrimination have focused on a posited original public meaning of the
statute’s text circa 1964 and relied on circuit court precedents holding that sexual
orientation and transgender discrimination claims are not cognizable under the
statute. Both sides of the debate are catalogued and critiqued herein.
The discussion proceeds as follows. As a prefatory matter, Part I discusses the
last-minute addition of the word “sex” to the list of characteristics protected from
discrimination in H.R. 7152, the proposed Civil Rights Act, and the path leading to
the sex amendment’s inclusion in the legislation signed into law by President Lyndon
B. Johnson on July 2, 1964. Part II examines the Supreme Court’s interpretations of
the statute’s “because of sex” prohibition, focusing on the Court’s initial sex
discrimination decisions and its subsequent recognition of unenvisaged causes of

governed by legislatively enacted statutes, creating an “age of statutes”).
13. Anya Bernstein, Before Interpretation, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 567, 596 (2017).
14. “LGBTQ” refers to lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer. “LGB” refers to
sexual orientation, the “emotional, romantic and/or sexual attractions of men to women or
women to men (heterosexual), of women to women or men to men (homosexual), or by men
or women to both sexes (bisexual).” Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, AM. PSYCHOL.
ASS’N, https://www.apa.org/topics/lgbt/index [https://perma.cc/8XWT-M894]. This change
has been implemented throughout the remainder of this Article. “T” refers to transgender or
gender nonconforming, “an umbrella term for people whose gender identity or gender
expression does not conform to that typically associated with the sex to which they were
assigned at birth.” Id. “Q” refers to queer, an “adjective used by some people . . . whose sexual
orientation is not exclusively heterosexual (e.g., queer person, queer woman).” GLAAD Media
Reference Guide – Lesbian / Gay / Bisexual Glossary of Terms, GLAAD,
https://www.glaad.org/reference/lgbtq
[https://perma.cc/TK38-5AH4].
For
persons
identifying as queer “the terms lesbian, gay, and bisexual are perceived to be too limiting
and/or fraught with cultural connotations they feel don’t apply to them.” Id.; see also
LGBTQIA
Res.
Ctr.,
LGBTQIA
Resource
Center
Glossary,
UCDAVIS,
https://lgbtqia.ucdavis.edu/educated/glossary [https://perma.cc/P9JE-52WE] (stating that
“LGBTQIA” refers to lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, intersex, and asexual).
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action for workplace sexual harassment, same-sex sexual harassment, and gender
nonconformity discrimination. Part III addresses the question of whether sexualorientation discrimination violates Title VII’s sex discrimination ban and examines
the justifications supporting and opposing statutory coverage in Hively, Zarda, and
Bostock.
Part IV turns to the separate and distinct issue of transgender discrimination and
the Sixth and Fifth Circuits’ contrary holdings in G.R. and R.G. Funeral Homes
(recognizing the claim) and Wittmer (foreclosing the claim). Part V concludes that
the
sexual-orientation-and-transgender-discrimination-is-sex-discrimination
position is the better, if not best, interpretation and application of Title VII’s “because
of sex” proscription. That view best comports with the language of the sex
discrimination provision as construed by the Supreme Court, lower courts, and the
EEOC and reflects a jurisprudential approach that does not render invisible
significant legal and contextual changes occurring in the half century following the
enactment of Title VII.
I. THE SEX DISCRIMINATION AMENDMENT
In 1964, the United States House of Representatives debated H.R. 7152, part of
the proposed Civil Rights Act prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of
race, color, religion, or national origin. On February 8, the eighth and last day of that
debate,15 Representative and House Rules Committee Chair Howard W. Smith,
Democrat from Virginia, introduced a floor amendment proposing the addition of the
word “sex” to the then-listed four categories of prohibited discrimination. The clerk
announced the amendment (“After the word ‘religion,’ insert ‘sex.’”).16 The House
“erupted in shock as the full import of the amendment sank in” 17 and “[t]wo hours of
pandemonium ensued.”18
The standard account of the introduction of the sex amendment holds that Smith
(an octogenarian racist and “die-hard opponent of integration and federal legislation
to enforce civil rights for African Americans”)19 did so in an attempt “to scuttle the
adoption of the Civil Rights Act”20 and make H.R. 7152 “so controversial that

15. See TODD S. PURDUM, AN IDEA WHOSE TIME HAS COME: TWO PRESIDENTS, TWO
PARTIES, AND THE BATTLE FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at 146 (2014); GILLIAN
THOMAS, BECAUSE OF SEX: ONE LAW, TEN CASES, AND FIFTY YEARS THAT CHANGED
AMERICAN WOMEN’S LIVES AT WORK 1 (2016).
16. CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 115 (1985).
17. Id.
18. PURDUM, supra note 15, at 195.
19. Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 139 (2d Cir. 2018) (en banc) (Lynch,
J., dissenting); see also Arianne Renan Barzilay, Parenting Title VII: Rethinking the History
of the Sex Discrimination Prohibition, 28 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 55, 67 (2016); Mary Anne
Case, Legal Protections for the “Personal Best” of Each Employee: Title VII’s Prohibition on
Sex Discrimination, The Legacy of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, and the Prospect of ENDA,
66 STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1339 (2014).
20. Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984).
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eventually it would be voted down either in the House or the Senate.” 21 Smith’s
“purpose was to sink civil rights for blacks by adding a similar guarantee for women;
although some congressmen would grant equal rights for men of both races, Smith
was certain that they would never extend those rights to women.”22 Agreeing with
that explanation for the amendment, Professor Catherine MacKinnon remarked that
“sex discrimination in private employment was forbidden only in a last minute joking
‘us boys’ attempt to defeat Title VII’s prohibition on racial discrimination” and that
“this attempted reductio ad absurdum failed” as the bill was ultimately enacted into
law.23 Speaking about the amendment after the enactment of Title VII, Franklin D.
Roosevelt, Jr., the first chair of the EEOC, stated that Smith introduced the
amendment to “‘create ridicule and confusion.’”24 And Herman Edelsberg, the
EEOC’s 1965–1967 executive director, described the amendment as “a fluke . . .
conceived out of wedlock.”25
A different account describes the legislative path to the ultimate adoption of the
sex discrimination amendment. In December 1963, the National Woman’s Party
(NWP) unanimously adopted a resolution to add the word “sex” to H.R. 7152 and
urged longtime NWP ally Smith to support the amendment. 26 Supporters of the Equal
Rights Amendment (ERA)27 also campaigned to have “sex” added to the bill, and

21. WHALEN & WHALEN, supra note 16, at 116.
22. BRUCE J. DIERENFIELD, KEEPER OF THE RULES: CONGRESSMAN HOWARD W. SMITH OF
VIRGINIA 194 (1987).
23. Catherine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J.
1281, 1283–84 (1991); see also Robert C. Bird, More Than a Congressional Joke: A Fresh
Look at the Legislative History of Sex Discrimination of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 3 WM. &
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 137, 152 (1997) (stating that Smith’s amendment was “a last ditch effort
to sink the Civil Rights Bill”); Cary Franklin, Inventing the Traditional Concept of Sex
Discrimination, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1307, 1318 (2012) (“[L]egal commentators have generally
characterized [Smith’s] intervention as a last-ditch, if ultimately unsuccessful, attempt to derail
a piece of legislation to which he was fiercely opposed.”).
24. Vicki Schultz, Taking Sex Discrimination Seriously, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 995, 1015
(2015) (quoting Edith Evans Asbury, Protest Proposed on Women’s Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
13, 1965, at 32).
25. Rachel Osterman, Comment, Origins of a Myth: Why Courts, Scholars, and the Public
Think Title VII’s Ban on Sex Discrimination Was an Accident, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 409,
416 (2009).
26. The resolution, “notable for its implicit racism, anti-Semitism, and xenophobia,”
stated that the bill would not “give protection against discrimination because of ‘race, color,
religion, or national origins’ to a White Woman, a Woman of the Christian Religion, or a
Woman of United States Origin.” ROSALIND ROSENBERG, JANE CROW: THE LIFE OF PAULI
MURRAY 275 (2017) (quoting the National Woman’s Party December 16, 1963 resolution);
see also SERENA MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE: FEMINISM, LAW, AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS
REVOLUTION 20 (2011) (“Some National Woman’s Party members marched to the
segregationists beat. For them, equal rights for women would only be undermined by an
association with black civil rights.”).
27. First introduced in Congress in 1923, see S.J. Res. 21, 68th Cong., 65 CONG. REC. 150
(1923), the ERA provided: “Men and women shall have equal rights throughout the United
States and every place subject to their jurisdiction. Congress shall have power to enforce this
article by appropriate legislation.” That language was changed in 1946 to include states:
“Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by
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Representatives Martha Griffiths, Democrat from Michigan, and Katherine St.
George, Republican from New York, sought support from southern legislators.
Believing that Smith (a sponsor of the ERA)28 could secure southern votes, Griffiths
asked him to propose the amendment.29 “For Smith, it was a win/win strategy: either
the sex amendment would defeat the Civil Rights Act—a regulation of private
business which he opposed—or it would amount to the passage of the ERA—a
measure that he had always supported.”30
Smith advised bill manager Emmanuel Celler, Democrat from New York and
chair of the House Judiciary Committee, that he would offer the “sex” amendment
as the NWP was “serious about it.”31 Smith appeared on Meet the Press two weeks
before proposing the amendment and was asked by reporter Elisabeth May Craig
(who was also a NWP member)32 whether he intended to add “sex” to H.R. 7152. “I
might do that,” he replied.33 Thus, Smith’s February 8 introduction of the amendment

any State on account of sex. Congress and the several States shall have power, within their
respective jurisdictions, to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.” S.J. Res. 61, 79th
Cong., 92 CONG. REC. 9223 (1946). Eleanor Roosevelt and other liberal Democrats opposed
the ERA “largely because it threatened their proud legacy of progressive legislation to protect
women in the workplace.” HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: ORIGINS AND
DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY 1960–1972, at 137 (1990). For more on the ERA, see
Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation of
Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 15–23 (1995). In 1972, Congress proposed the ERA
with a resolution that it be approved within seven years. It was ratified by thirty-five of the
thirty-eight states required for adoption. In 1978 a new Congressional resolution extended the
ratification deadline to June 30, 1982. No additional states voted for ratification. Most recently,
Nevada approved the amendment in 2017 as did Illinois in 2018. In January 2019, the Virginia
Senate voted for ratification and the measure was sent to the Virginia House of Delegates
where it died after it failed to clear a House subcommittee. See Jenna Portnoy, ERA Bill Dies
for Good in GOP-Controlled Virginia House of Delegates, WASH. POST (Feb. 21, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/virginia-politics/virginia-house-kills-era-ratification
-bill/2019/02/21/82920204-3560-11e9-854a-7a14d7fec96a_story.html
[https://perma.cc/U42E-2PN3].
28. In 1945, the NWP persuaded Smith to sponsor the ERA. As Virginia and other
southern states provided the textile industry with cheap female labor, the NWP emphasized to
Smith and other southern legislators that the ERA would strike down protective labor laws
limiting the number of hours women could work. ROSENBERG, supra note 26, at 275. Thus,
Smith may have had a secondary purpose in supporting the sex amendment. Southern industry,
particularly textile mills such as those in Virginia, relied heavily on cheap female labor toiling
in sweatshop conditions to remain profitable. Recently passed protective laws for women had
endangered this exploitation. A sex amendment would strike down such sex-based legislation
that hurt southern companies. As a result, Smith and other southern Democrats may have
adopted a chivalrous pose to assist local businesses. By adding the sex amendment, the Judge
apparently hoped either to defeat the bill or, if it passed, to assist southern businessmen.
DIERENFIELD, supra note 22, at 194.
29. See ROSENBERG, supra note 26, at 276.
30. Franke, supra note 27, at 23.
31. Id.
32. See Carl M. Brauer, Women Activists, Southern Conservatives, and the Prohibition of
Sex Discrimination in Title VII, 49 J. SOUTHERN HIST. 37, 44 (1983).
33. ROSENBERG, supra note 26, at 276.
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“could not have come as a surprise”34 as he “had been dropping hints for weeks” that
he would do just that.35
The amendment was debated on the floor of the House of Representatives for two
hours; all but one of the female members of the House spoke in favor of the
addition.36 Representative Griffiths warned “a vote against this amendment today by
a white man is a vote against his wife, or his widow, or his daughter, or his sister.” 37
Stating that “[i]t would be incredible to me that white men would be willing to place
white women at such a disadvantage,” Griffiths also emphasized the need to protect
African-American women from workplace sex discrimination, such as a black
female dishwasher wishing to move from “a greasy spoon” to a “very good restaurant
which employed only . . . white men” and “a colored woman political scientist”
seeking a job at a college or university where a female political scientist had never
been employed.38
Representative St. George made clear her support for the amendment:
We do not want special privilege. We do not need special privilege. We
outlast you—we outlive you—we nag you to death. So why would we
want special privileges? I believe that we can hold our own. We are
entitled to this little crumb of equality. The addition of that little,
terrifying word “s-e-x” will not hurt this legislation in any way. In fact,
it will improve it. It will make it comprehensive. It will make it logical.
It will make it right.39
St. George noted the days “when women were chattels” and “belonged, first of all,
to their fathers; then to their husbands or to their nearest male relative,” with “no
command over their own property.”40 Another legislator, Edna Kelly, Democrat from
New York, declared her “support and sponsorship of this amendment and of this bill”
in “an endeavor to have all persons, men and women, possess the same rights and
same opportunities.”41 Representative L. Mendel Rivers, Democrat from South
Carolina, argued that prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion,
and national origin but not sex would deny opportunity to “the white woman of
mostly Anglo-Saxon or Christian heritage.” 42
Opposing the amendment, Representative Robert Griffin, Republican from
Michigan, proposed an amendment that would have required a sworn statement by a
female employee that her spouse was unemployed before she could file a sex
discrimination claim.43 Griffin believed that his amendment “would not prevent or
prohibit any married woman from working because her husband also has a job.”44

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

PURDUM, supra note 15, at 196.
THOMAS, supra note 15, at 2.
See Franke, supra note 27, at 23–24.
110 CONG. REC. 2580 (1964) (statement of Rep. Griffiths).
Id. at 2579, 2583.
Id. at 2580–81 (statement of Rep. St. George).
Id. at 2581.
Id. at 2583 (statement of Rep. Kelly).
Id. at 2579 (statement of Rep. Rivers).
See id. at 2731 (statement of Rep. Griffin).
Id.
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However, as noted by Professor Cary Franklin, “as a practical matter, it would permit
employers to prefer male workers over married women, and thereby ensure that a
woman who enjoyed the financial support of a husband could not lay out a claim to
a job that might otherwise go to ‘an unemployed man with a family to support.’” 45
Bill manager, Representative Emanuel Celler, an opponent of both the “sex”
amendment and the ERA, posed the following questions:
Would male citizens be justified in insisting that women share with them
the burdens of compulsory military service? What would become of
traditional family relationships? What about alimony? Who would have
the obligation of supporting whom? Would fathers rank equally with
mothers in the right of custody to children? What would become of the
crimes of rape and statutory rape? Would the Mann Act be invalidated?
Would the many State and local provisions regulating working
conditions and hours of employment for women be struck down? 46
Celler also spoke of the “delightful accord” in his home: “I usually have the last two
words and those words are ‘Yes, dear.’”47
Also opposing the amendment, Representative Edith Green, Democrat from
Oregon and the author of the Equal Pay Act of 1963,48 argued that it would “clutter
up the bill and it may later . . . be used to help destroy this section of the bill by some
of the very people who today support it.”49 Fearing that she would be called an Uncle
Tom or Aunt Jane, Green stated that race discrimination was a more serious problem
than sex discrimination and that sex-specific workplace practices could be justified
by biological differences between men and women.50 “For every discrimination that
has been made against a woman in this country there has been 10 times as much
discrimination against the Negro of this country.”51
At the end of the two-hour debate, and with no hearings held, the House voted
168–133 in favor of Smith’s sex amendment. H.R. 7152, as amended, passed the
House by a 290–130 vote.52 When the bill came before the United States Senate,

45. Franklin, supra note 23, at 1323 (quoting 110 CONG. REC. 2577 (1964) (statement of
Rep. Celler)).
46. 110 CONG. REC. 2577 (1964) (statement of Rep. Celler).
47. Id. at 2684.
48. See KIMBERLY A. YURACKO, GENDER NONCONFORMITY AND THE LAW 30 (2016). The
Equal Pay Act provides that an employer shall not discriminate “between employees on the
basis of sex by paying wages to employees . . . at a rate less than the rate at which he pays
wages to employees of the opposite sex . . . for equal work on jobs the performance of which
requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working
conditions.” 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2012). Representative Green noted that male Representatives
supporting the Title VII sex amendment had opposed the EPA when that legislation was
debated a few months earlier. See 110 CONG. REC. 2581 (1964) (statement of Rep. Green).
49. U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VII AND
XI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at 3221 (1968).
50. See 110 CONG. REC. 2584 (1964) (statement of Rep. Green).
51. Id. at 2581.
52. See Barzilay, supra note 19, at 94. “Of all the congressmen who spoke for the adoption
of the sex amendment, all except one ultimately voted against the Act.” Id. at 95.
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Everett Dirksen, Republican from Illinois and Senate minority leader, considered
removing the word “sex” from the bill.53 Advised of that development, lawyer and
activist Pauli Murray54 drafted a memorandum showing the parallels between race
and sex discrimination and arguing that “the basic principle that the right to a job
without discrimination is a fundamental and individual right.” 55 If the “sex”
amendment was removed from the legislation “both Negro and white women will
share a common fate of discrimination, since it is exceedingly difficult for a Negro
woman to determine whether or not she is being discriminated against because of
race or sex.”56 Murray’s memorandum was distributed to Attorney General Robert
F. Kennedy, Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey, Senator Dirksen, Senator
Margaret Chase Smith, Lady Bird Johnson, and others.57 Dirksen did urge the
Republican Senate conference to strike the amendment; Senator Smith opposed that
move, and the sex discrimination amendment remained in the bill.58
After the longest continuous filibuster in Senate history, that body voted for the
legislation. The House voted for the Senate version on July 2 and that same day
President Lyndon B. Johnson (whose administration had opposed the sex
amendment)59 signed the Civil Rights Act into law.60 With the passage of Title VII,
“the modern law of sex discrimination got its statutory footing,” and “the parallelism
the act established between various types of forbidden discrimination assured that
concepts developed in one area would be used in others.” 61

53. See PURDUM, supra note 15, at 254; ROSENBERG, supra note 26, at 277.
54. For discussion of Murray’s life and work, see K ENNETH W. MACK, REPRESENTING
THE RACE: THE CREATION OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS LAWYER 207–33 (2012); see also ROSENBERG,
supra
note
26;
Duke
Human
Rights
Ctr.,
Pauli
Murray
Project,
https://paulimurrayproject.org/ [https://perma.cc/7PG4-48T3].
55. ROSENBERG, supra note 26, at 277 (quoting Memorandum from Pauli Murray in
Support of Retaining the Amendment to H.R. 7152, Title VII (Equal Employment
Opportunity) to Prohibit Discrimination in Employment Because of Sex (Apr. 14, 1964))
[hereinafter Murray memorandum] (on file with the Indiana Law Journal).
56. Id. at 278 (quoting Murray memorandum); see also Pauli Murray & Mary O.
Eastwood, Jane Crow and the Law: Sex Discrimination and Title VII, 34 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
232, 243 (1965) (“If ‘sex’ had not been added to the equal employment opportunity provisions
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Negro women would have shared with white women the
common fate of discrimination since it is exceedingly difficult to determine whether a Negro
woman is being discriminated against because of race or sex. Without the addition of ‘sex,’
Title VII would have protected only half the potential Negro work force.”).
57. See ROSENBERG, supra note 26, at 279.
58. See id.
59. See Brauer, supra note 32, at 46 (noting Deputy Attorney General Nicholas
Katzenbach’s view that the amendment “might overburden the legislation”); see also HUGH
DAVIS GRAHAM, CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE PRESIDENCY: RACE AND GENDER IN AMERICAN
POLITICS 1960–1972, at 75 (1992) (noting Katzenbach’s opposition to the amendment).
60. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
61. Paul Gewirtz, The Triumph and Transformation of Antidiscrimination Law, in RACE,
LAW AND CULTURE: REFLECTIONS ON BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 110, 112 (Austin Sarat
ed., 1997).
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II. DISCRIMINATION “BECAUSE OF SEX”
In pertinent part, Title VII prohibits employment discrimination “because of [an]
individual’s . . . sex.”62 The Supreme Court has defined “[t]he words ‘because of’
[to] mean ‘by reason of: on account of.’”63 This causation standard requires “the
plaintiff to show ‘that the harm would not have occurred’ in the absence of—that is,
but for—the defendant’s conduct.”64 Beginning in 1991,65 Title VII plaintiffs
alleging status-based (race, color, religion, sex, or national origin) discrimination can
satisfy a relaxed and lessened causation standard by “show[ing] that the motive to
discriminate was one of the employer’s motives, even if the employer also had other,
lawful motives which were causative in the employer’s decision.”66
Whether and how certain employer conduct violates the “because of sex”
prohibition has been addressed by the Supreme Court in various contexts including
those discussed in the following sections of this Part.
A. Initial Supreme Court Rulings
In its first Title VII sex discrimination ruling, Phillips v. Martin Marietta
Corporation,67 the Court held that an employer policy denying employment to
women but not men with pre-school-age children violated the statute’s requirement
“that persons of like qualifications be given employment opportunities irrespective
of their sex.”68 Interestingly, the Court also stated that conflicting family obligations
demonstrated to be more relevant to a woman’s job performance could provide an
employer with a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) defense to a sex
discrimination claim.69 A concurring Justice Thurgood Marshall did not agree that a
BFOQ “could be established by a showing that some women, even the vast majority,
with pre-school children have family responsibilities that interfere with job
performance and that men do not usually have such responsibilities.” 70 He feared that

62. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
63. Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009) (quoting 1
WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 194 (1966)).
64. Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Center v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 346–47 (2013) (quoting
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 431 (AM. LAW INST. 1934)); see also EEOC v. Abercrombie
& Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2032 (2015) (“‘[B]ecause of’ . . . typically imports, at a
minimum, the traditional standard of but-for causation.”).
65. See infra notes 131–32 and accompanying text.
66. Nassar, 570 U.S. at 343; see also Abercrombie & Fitch, 135 S. Ct. at 2032; 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(m) (“[A]n unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party
demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any
employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.”).
67. 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (per curiam).
68. Id. at 544.
69. See id.; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (stating that an employer does not discriminate when
it hires and employs an employee “on the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in those
certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational
qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or
enterprise”).
70. Phillips, 400 U.S. at 544 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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the Court had “fallen into the trap of assuming that the Act permits ancient canards
about the proper role of women to be a basis for discrimination. Congress, however,
sought just the opposite result.”71
City of Los Angeles Department of Water & Power v. Manhart72 held unlawful an
employer policy requiring women to make pension plan contributions 14.84% higher
than the contributions made by male employees, a practice resulting in lower takehome pay for female workers with the same salaries as their male counterparts.73 The
employer justified the contribution differential on the ground that, because women
live longer than men, the cost of a pension for the average female retiree is greater
than for the average male retiree since the average female retiree will receive more
monthly pension payments. The Court held that this aspect of the policy violated
Title VII. While it is unquestionably true that “[w]omen, as a class, do live longer
than men,”74 the Court declared that Title VII focuses on the individual, and that in
enacting the statute “Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate
treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.”75 Thus, “employment
decisions cannot be predicated on mere ‘stereotyped’ impressions about the
characteristics of males or females. Myths and purely habitual assumptions about a
woman’s ability to perform certain kinds of work are no longer acceptable reasons
for refusing to employ qualified individuals, or for paying them less.” 76 Requiring a
woman to contribute more to a pension plan “simply because . . . [she] is a woman,
rather than a man, is in direct conflict with both the language and the policy of the
Act”77 and “does not pass the simple test of whether the evidence shows ‘treatment
of a person . . . which but for that person’s sex would be different.’” 78
Discrimination on the basis of pregnancy was held not to be unlawful sex
discrimination under Title VII in the Court’s 1977 General Electric Co. v. Gilbert
decision.79 Relying on Geduldig v. Aiello,80 the Court ruled that the plaintiffs made
no showing that the employer invidiously or pretextually discriminated against
members of one sex when it excluded pregnancy disability benefits from its disability
benefits plan. “Pregnancy is, of course, confined to women, but it is in other ways
significantly different from the typical covered disease or disability.” 81

71. Id. at 545.
72. 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
73. Id. at 712.
74. Id. at 707.
75. Id. at 707 n.13 (quoting Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th
Cir. 1971)).
76. Id. at 707 (footnote omitted).
77. Id. at 711.
78. Id. (quoting Developments in the Law, Employment Discrimination and Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1174 (1971)).
79. 429 U.S. 125 (1977).
80. 417 U.S. 484 (1974). In Geduldig, the Court held that the exclusion of pregnancy
benefits from a disability benefits plan’s coverage did not violate the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 497;
see also U.S. CONST. amend., XIV, § 1. “The program divides potential recipients into two
groups—pregnant women and nonpregnant persons. While the first group is exclusively
female, the second includes members of both sexes.” Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 497 n.20.
81. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 136.
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Congress quickly responded to and legislatively overruled Gilbert in the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA).82 Thereafter, in Newport News
Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC,83 the Court held that the employer’s health
insurance plan (amended on the effective date of the PDA) violated Title VII by
providing pregnancy-related hospitalization benefits to female employees but not to
the female spouses of male employees. “Such a practice would not pass the simple
test of Title VII discrimination that we enunciated in Los Angeles Dept. of Water &
Power v. Manhart for . . . male employee[s] with dependents [whom were treated]
‘in a manner which but for that person’s sex would be different.’” 84 Furthermore, and
significantly, the Court opined that the fact that pre-enactment discussion of the PDA
focused on female and not male employees did “not create a ‘negative inference’
limiting the scope of the Act to the specific problem that motivated its enactment.” 85
Unenvisaged discrimination against male employees did not foreclose their cause of
action.
As can be seen in the aforementioned cases, the question whether alleged
discrimination is unlawful discrimination “because of sex” was answered in the
affirmative after the application of the “simple test” of whether the evidence
demonstrated treatment of the plaintiff which but for her sex would have been
different. Martin Marietta’s denial of employment to the female plaintiff pursuant to
its policy of hiring men but not woman with pre-school-age children was because of
her sex and would not have occurred if she was a man. Higher pension plan
contributions women were required to pay, because their life expectancy, as a class,
was longer than the life expectancy of men, also did not pass the simple “but for”
test. Nor did an employer’s “because of sex” discrimination against men in the
provision of pregnancy-related hospitalization benefits. In each instance, the at-issue
disparate treatment of women and men would have been different but for their sex.
B. Sexual Harassment
In enacting Title VII in 1964, the 88th Congress did not contemplate that the
statute’s sex discrimination prohibition banned workplace sexual harassment. 86 As

82. See Pub. L. No. 95-955, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §
2000e(k)). The PDA provides, among other things, that “the terms ‘because of sex’ or ‘on the
basis of sex’ include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth,
or related medical conditions.” Id.
83. 462 U.S. 669 (1983).
84. Id. at 682–83 (quoting L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711
(1978)).
85. Id. at 680. For additional Court decisions interpreting the PDA, see Young v. UPS,
135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015); Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
86. See, e.g., Trina Jones, Title VII at 50: Contemporary Challenges for U.S. Employment
Discrimination Law, 6 ALA. CIV. R. & CIV. LIB. L. REV. 45, 60 (2014) (Congress arguably
did not contemplate a sexual harassment cause of action in 1964); Ellen Frankel Paul, Sexual
Harassment as Sex Discrimination: A Defective Paradigm, 8 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 333, 346
(1990) (“In all likelihood, the members of Congress would have been quite surprised to learn
that they had contemplated including sexual harassment within the confines of sex
discrimination—especially since the term ‘sexual harassment’ did not come into currency until
the late 1970s.”).
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discussed in this section, post-enactment developments charted a path that ultimately
led to the Supreme Court’s recognition of that Title VII claim.
In 1971 the EEOC issued agency decisions concluding that workplace racial and
national origin harassment violated Title VII.87 That same year the Fifth Circuit, in
Rogers v. EEOC, recognized a Title VII claim for racial and ethnic harassment, and
concluded “employees’ psychological as well as economic fringes [were] statutorily
entitled to protection from employer abuse.”88 Other court decisions in the 1970s
held that Title VII prohibited racial,89 religious,90 and national origin harassment. 91
Sexual harassment, a term reportedly coined by Cornell University professors in
early 1975,92 was judicially recognized as sex discrimination in Williams v. Saxbe93
and Barnes v. Costle.94 Not all courts agreed with that view; however, one opined
that a supervisor’s harassment was “nothing more than a personal proclivity,
peculiarity, or mannerism . . . satisfying a personal urge.” 95
Activists and scholars challenged the view that sexual harassment did not violate
Title VII. In May 1975, Working Women United held the first “Speak-Out on Sexual
Harassment,”96 and Carroll Brodsky’s 1976 book The Harassed Worker97 discussed
and defined sexual harassment. Catherine MacKinnon’s influential 1979 work
Sexual Harassment of Working Women: A Case of Sex Discrimination argued that
sexual harassment—“the unwanted imposition of sexual requirements in the context
of a relationship of unequal power” and “the use of power derived from one social
sphere to lever benefits or impose deprivations in another”—is sex discrimination
proscribed by Title VII.98

87. EEOC Dec. No. 72-0679, 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 441 (1971); EEOC Dec.
No. 71-2598, 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 21 (1971).
88. 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971). Circuit Judge Paul Hirsch Roney dissented, finding
nothing in the statute or its legislative history indicating a congressional concern about whether
an employer’s business was “environmentally attractive” to all employees or whether an
individual employee “might be uncomfortable or have feelings of unhappiness in his
employment. . . . Congress has simply not given this scope to its legislation.” Id. at 246 (Roney,
J., dissenting).
89. E.g., Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equal. v. City of St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506 (8th Cir.
1977); Gray v. Greyhound Lines E., 545 F.2d 169 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
90. E.g., Compston v. Borden, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 157 (S.D. Ohio 1976).
91. E.g., Cariddi v. Kan. City Chiefs Football Club, 568 F.2d 87 (8th Cir. 1977) (per
curiam).
92. See FRED STREBEIGH, EQUAL: WOMEN RESHAPE AMERICAN LAW 218–25 (2009)
(sexual harassment was coined by Cornell professors Lin Farley, Susan Meyer, and Karen
Sauvigné in early 1975); THOMAS, supra note 15, at 84.
93. 413 F. Supp. 654, 658 (D.D.C. 1976).
94. 561 F.2d 983, 994 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
95. Corne v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975); see also
Tomkins v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553, 556 (D.N.J. 1976) (Title VII was
“not intended to provide a federal tort remedy” for sexually-motivated attacks in the
workplace), rev’d, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977).
96. Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1685 n.2,
1698–99 (1998).
97. CARROLL M. BRODSKY, THE HARASSED WORKER (1976).
98. CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF
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Another significant development in sexual harassment law and policy occurred in
1980 when the EEOC issued its Guidelines on Sex Discrimination and defined sexual
harassment:
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal
or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when
(1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a
term or condition of an individual’s employment, (2) submission to or
rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for
employment decisions affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct has
the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual’s
work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive
working environment.99
In 1986, twenty-two years after the passage of Title VII, the Supreme Court
recognized a Title VII hostile environment claim for supervisory sexual harassment
in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson.100 Justice William H. Rehnquist’s opinion
for a unanimous Court stated, “Without question, when a supervisor sexually
harasses a subordinate because of the subordinate’s sex, that supervisor
discriminate[s] on the basis of sex.”101 He rejected, for two reasons, the employer’s
argument that Congress was only concerned with tangible economic barriers caused
by discrimination and not with the psychological aspects of a work environment.
“First, the language of Title VII is not limited to ‘economic’ or ‘tangible’
discrimination. The phrase ‘terms, conditions, or privileges of employment’ evinces
a congressional intent ‘to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men
and women’ in employment.”102 Second, the EEOC’s Guidelines, while not
controlling, drew “upon a substantial body of judicial decisions and EEOC
precedent” and “fully support the view that harassment leading to noneconomic
injury can violate Title VII.”103 Justice Rehnquist also cited the Fifth Circuit’s Rogers
v. EEOC104 decision and other lower court rulings prohibiting racial, religious, and
national origin harassment. 105 “Nothing in Title VII suggests a hostile environment
based on discriminatory sexual harassment should not likewise be prohibited.”106
Meritor thus relied on statutory text, lower court decisions, and the EEOC’s
Guidelines in recognizing as actionable hostile-environment sexual harassment
claims. The Court was not persuaded by the employer’s argument that Title VII’s
history and the circumstances of its enactment compelled the conclusion that sexual

SEX DISCRIMINATION 1 (1979).
99. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a).
100. 477 U.S. 57 (1986). A hostile work environment is one in which the challenged
conduct is “sufficiently severe or pervasive ‘to alter the conditions of [the victim’s]
employment and create an abusive working environment.’” Id. at 67 (quoting Henson v. City
of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982)).
101. Id. at 64 (alteration in original).
102. Id. (quoting L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)).
103. Id. at 65.
104. 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971).
105. See, e.g., Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66.
106. Id. (emphasis in original).
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harassment was not “within the ambit of Congressional concern,”107 or by the amicus
Chamber of Commerce of the United States’s position that a sexual harassment
action was not justiciable because “Title VII does not contain an express provision
concerning sexual harassment.”108
Did a male employee’s allegation that other male employees sexually harassed
him state an actionable Title VII claim? That was the question before the Court in
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.109 Seeking a negative answer from the
Court, the employer argued that Congress would have drafted Title VII differently if
it meant to cover same-sex sexual harassment; that the harassment issue “does not
involve a difference between the sexes” or otherwise implicate the statute’s goal of
equal employment opportunity for men and women; and that same-sex harassment
“is an entirely separate area of concern that cannot and should not be grafted onto
Title VII.”110
Yet another unanimous Court, in an opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia, held that
the same-sex sexual harassment claim was actionable. Noting that Title VII’s
“because of sex” prohibition protects both men and women,111 he rejected a
conclusive presumption that an employer will not discriminate against a member of
the employer’s own sex or race.112 “If our precedents leave any doubt on the question,
we hold today that nothing in Title VII necessarily bars a claim of discrimination
‘because of . . . sex’ merely because the plaintiff and the defendant (or the person
charged with acting on behalf of the defendant) are of the same sex.” 113 The “critical
issue, Title VII’s text indicates, is whether members of one sex are exposed to
disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which members of the other
sex are not exposed.”114
In an important passage of his opinion Justice Scalia addressed head-on the
argument that the scope of Title VII was limited to the concerns of members of
Congress in 1964:
We see no justification in the statutory language or our precedents for a
categorical rule excluding same-sex harassment claims from the
coverage of Title VII. As some courts have observed, male-on-male

107. Brief of Petitioner, Meritor, 477 U.S. 57 (No. 84-1979), 1985 WL 669769, at *14.
108. Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief and Brief for the Chamber of
Commerce of the United States as Amicus Curiae, Meritor, 477 U.S. 57 (No. 84-1979), 1985
WL 669770, at *5.
109. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
110. Brief for Respondents, Oncale, 523 U.S. 75 (No. 96-568), 1997 WL 634147, at *17.
111. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 78; see also ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING
LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 104 (2012) (“[T]here is no textual basis [in Title
VII] for limiting its protections to women.”).
112. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 78.
113. Id. at 79.
114. Id. at 80 (citation omitted). Professor David Schwartz has argued that the Court’s
“emphasis on ‘because of sex’ as the touchstone of sex discrimination works against the
exclusion of lesbians and gays. . . . Discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is thus,
in the plainest of language, discrimination on the basis of sex within the terms of Title VII.”
David S. Schwartz, When is Sex Because of Sex?: The Causation Problem in Sexual
Harassment Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1789 (2002).
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sexual harassment in the workplace was assuredly not the principal evil
Congress was concerned with when it enacted Title VII. But statutory
prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably
comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather
than the principal concerns of our legislators by which we are governed.
Title VII prohibits “discriminat[ion] . . . because of . . . sex” in the
“terms” or “conditions” of employment. Our holding that this includes
sexual harassment must extend to sexual harassment of any kind that
meets the statutory requirements.115
Statutory text and the Court’s precedents controlled the outcome of the case.
C. Sex Stereotyping and Gender Nonconformity Discrimination
Any discussion of the Title VII term “sex” must consider the interpretive
consequences of the Supreme Court’s 1989 decision in Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins.116 Ann Hopkins unsuccessfully sought promotion to partner in Price
Waterhouse’s Washington, D.C. office. Partners considering her bid praised her
character and accomplishments and work with clients. However, partners also
criticized Hopkins’s abrasiveness with staff members, criticized her use of profanity,
described her as “macho,” suggested that she take “a course at a charm school,” and
commented that she had “matured from a tough-talking somewhat masculine hardnosed [manager] to an authoritative, formidable, but much more appealing lady
[partner] candidate.”117 Another partner “delivered the coup de grace” when he
advised Hopkins to “walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more
femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.” 118
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., in a plurality opinion, concluded that Hopkins had
been subjected to unlawful sex stereotyping and that gender119 had played a
motivating part in the adverse employment decision she challenged.

115. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79–80 (alteration in original) (emphasis added).
116. 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (plurality opinion), superseded in part by statute, Civil Rights
Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, tit. I, § 107(a), 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)). For more on this seminal decision, see generally T HOMAS, supra
note 15, at 127–47 (narrative of Plaintiff’s experience before, during, and after the case); Ann
Hopkins, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins: A Personal Account of a Sexual Discrimination
Plaintiff, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 357 (2005) (article written by the Plaintiff and her
perspective on the case).
117. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235.
118. Id.
119. Gender identity is “[o]ne’s innermost concept of self as male, female, a blend of both
or neither—how individuals perceive themselves and what they call themselves. One’s gender
identity can be the same or different from their sex assigned at birth.” Sexual Orientation and
Gender
Identity
Definitions,
HUMAN
RIGHTS
CAMPAIGN,
https://www.hrc.org/resources/sexual-orientation-and-gender-identity-terminology-and
-definitions [https://perma.cc/6PAB-7W6R]. “[G]ender expressions might be defined and
limited to those commonly associated with masculinity or femininity” and “be defined by
those expressions that are socially group identified.” YURACKO, supra note 48, at 144.
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In saying that gender played a motivating part in an employment
decision, we mean that, if we asked the employer at the moment of the
decision what its reasons were and if we received a truthful response, one
of those reasons would be that the applicant or employee was a woman.
In the specific context of sex stereotyping, an employer who acts on the
basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not
be, has acted on the basis of gender.120
Justice Brennan did not quarrel with the district court’s conclusion that a number
of the partners’ comments about Hopkins demonstrated that she was subjected to sex
stereotyping.121
As for the legal relevance of sex stereotyping, we are beyond the day
when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting
that they matched the stereotype associated with their group, for “[i]n
forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals because of their
sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate
treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.”122
While workplace remarks and actions based on such stereotypes do not inevitably
establish that gender played a role in a particular employment decision, they “can
certainly be evidence that gender played a part.”123 Remanding the case for further
proceedings, Justice Brennan instructed that the relevant question to be answered
was whether the partners who evaluated Hopkins “in sex-based terms would have
criticized her as sharply (or criticized her at all) if she had been a man.” 124
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s concurring opinion agreed with the district
court’s findings that a number of partners referred to Hopkins’s “failure to conform
to certain gender stereotypes as a factor militating against her election to the
partnership,” and that the partner responsible for informing Hopkins of the reasons
her candidacy was placed on hold told her that her “‘professional’ problems would
be solved if she would ‘walk more femininely, talk more femininely, wear make-up,
have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.’”125 Hopkins thus “proved that Price
Waterhouse ‘permitt[ed] stereotypical attitudes towards women to play a significant,
though unquantifiable, role in its decision not to invite her to become a partner.’” 126
“At this point,” the Justice concluded, “Ann Hopkins had taken her proof as far as it
could go” and had “proved that participants in the process considered her failure to

120. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250 (plurality opinion) (footnote omitted).
121. Id. at 251.
122. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435
U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 258. On remand, the district court held that Price Waterhouse failed to show that
it would have placed Hopkins’ partnership candidacy on hold even in the absence of the
negative, sex-stereotyped evaluations she received. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 737 F. Supp.
1202 (D.D.C. 1990), aff’d, 920 F.2d 967 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
125. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 272 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Hopkins v.
Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109 (D.D.C. 1985)).
126. Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
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conform to the stereotypes credited by a number of the decisionmakers had been a
substantial factor in the decision.”127
As later described by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy (who dissented in Price
Waterhouse),128 six Justices in that case agreed that a plaintiff could prevail by
showing that one of the traits prohibited by Title VII was a motivating or substantial
factor in the employer’s decision.129 And a majority of the Price Waterhouse Court
determined that a plaintiff who made that showing in a mixed-motives case (one
involving both lawful and unlawful employer motives) shifted the burden of
persuasion to the employer which could avoid liability by showing that it would have
made the same decision in the absence of the discriminatory factor. “In other words,
the employer had to show that a discriminatory motive was not the but-for cause of
the adverse employment action.”130 Congress responded to this aspect of Price
Waterhouse in the Civil Rights Act of 1991,131 adding a lessened “motivating factor”
causation standard as well as a limited affirmative defense applicable in mixedmotives cases.132
Price Waterhouse went beyond merely prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
an individual’s biological sex (male or female). Ann Hopkins was discriminated
against not because she was a “woman per se,” but because she was, in the
employer’s view, not “womanly enough.”133 “The Court’s seemingly simple
declaration” that penalizing employees based on stereotypes about how they should
behave “has been the most important development in sex discrimination
jurisprudence since the passage of Title VII” and “has been responsible for dramatic
expansions in how courts have interpreted the act’s coverage.”134 Whether that
expansion includes Title VII coverage sexual orientation and transgender
discrimination is discussed in the ensuing Parts.

127. Id.
128. Id. at 294 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that Title VII “creates no independent
cause of action” for sex stereotyping and that evidence of sex stereotyping, while relevant to
the issue of discriminatory intent, does not answer the question whether the plaintiff was
harmed by discrimination).
129. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 348 (2013) (citing Price
Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258 (plurality opinion)).
130. Id. at 348.
131. Pub. L. No. 102-166, tit. I, § 107(a), 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)).
132. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012) (“[A]n unlawful employment practice is
established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also
motivated the practice.”); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(A)–(B) (2012) (stating that an employer
making the same-decision showing in a mixed-motives case may be subject to declaratory and
injunctive relief and may be required to pay certain attorney’s fees and costs; the plaintiff shall
not receive a court order of reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or back pay).
133. EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560, 572 (6th Cir. 2018).
134. YURACKO, supra note 48, at 5.
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III. SEXUAL-ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION: BECAUSE OF SEX?
Is sexual-orientation discrimination unlawful sex discrimination under and within
the meaning of Title VII? In the decades following the enactment of the statute
federal courts of appeals repeatedly answered no.135 For instance, in 1979 the Ninth
Circuit held that Title VII “should not be judicially extended to include sexual
preference such as homosexuality.”136 Ten years later, the Eighth Circuit concluded
that “Title VII does not prohibit discrimination against homosexuals” 137 and, in 1996,
the Fourth Circuit stated, “Title VII does not afford a cause of action for
discrimination based upon sexual orientation.”138
More recently, the question whether sexual-orientation discrimination is unlawful
sex discrimination has been answered by the Seventh Circuit (yes),139 Second Circuit
(yes),140 and Eleventh Circuit (no).141 This Part examines the various arguments
made in these cases for and against the sexual-orientation-discrimination-is-sexdiscrimination position.
A. “Because of Sex”
1. Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College of Indiana
In Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College of Indiana,142 Kimberly Hively, who is
openly lesbian, sued the college and alleged that her employment was terminated
because of her sexual orientation. Dismissing her suit, the district court held that
sexual orientation is not a protected category under Title VII.143 A Seventh Circuit
panel, deeming itself bound by Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.144 and other circuit

135. See Evans v. Georgia Reg. Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1255–57 (11th Cir. 2017), cert.
denied, 138 S. Ct. 557 (2017); Kalich v. AT & T Mobility, LLC, 679 F.3d 464, 471 (6th Cir.
2012); Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 762 (6th Cir. 2006); Medina v. Income
Support Div., 413 F.3d 1131, 1135 (10th Cir. 2005); Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prods., Inc.,
332 F.3d 1058, 1062 (7th Cir. 2003), overruled by Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853
F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc); Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1063–64
(9th Cir. 2002); Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 261 (3d Cir. 2001);
Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 2000), overruled by Zarda v. Altitude Express,
Inc., 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018) (en banc); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194
F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984);
Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1982); Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp.,
597 F.2d 936, 938 (5th Cir. 1979); Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 661
(9th Cir. 1977).
136. DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 329–30 (9th Cir. 1979).
137. Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69, 70 (8th Cir. 1989).
138. Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 143 (4th Cir. 1996).
139. Hively, 853 F.3d at 339.
140. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 100.
141. Bostock v. Clayton Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs., 723 F. App’x 964 (11th Cir. 2018).
142. 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
143. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., No. 3:14-cv-1791, 2015 WL 926015, at *3 (N.D. Ind.
Mar. 3, 2015), rev’d, Hively, 853 F.3d at 341.
144. 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984).
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decisions, held that Hively’s sexual orientation claim was not actionable. Vacating
that decision and rehearing the case en banc, the court reversed, holding that
“discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is a form of sex discrimination.”145
Chief Judge Pamela Wood’s majority opinion remarked that the interpretive
question before the court was not whether Title VII could be judicially amended to
add sexual orientation to the statute’s prohibition of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin discrimination.146 “Obviously[,] that lies beyond our power.”147
Rather, the issue was a pure question of statutory interpretation well within the
judiciary’s competence: what does it mean to discriminate on the basis of sex, and is
an action taken because of an individual’s sexual orientation a subset of a prohibited
action taken because of sex? 148 Noting Ivy Tech’s argument that Congress has
frequently considered but has not added the words “sexual orientation” to Title
VII,149 the Chief Judge responded that where a “statute is plain on its face[]” there is
no need to resort to secondary sources, such as legislative history or unsuccessful
efforts to change the law.150 And when a statute is not pellucid, “the best source for

145. Hively, 853 F.3d at 341.
146. Id. at 343 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)).
147. Id.
148. Id. For an affirmative answer to the latter question, see Katie R. Eyer, Statutory
Originalism and LGBT Rights, 54 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 63, 77–78 (2019).
149. See, e.g., Equality Act, S. 1006, 115th Cong. (2017); Equality Act, H.R. 2282, 115th
Cong. (2017); Equality Act, S. 1858, 114th Cong. (2015); Equality Act, H.R. 3185, 114th
Cong. (2015); Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, S. 815, 113th Cong. (2013);
Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2011, S. 811, 112th Cong. (2011); Employment NonDiscrimination Act of 2009, S. 1584, 111th Cong. (2009); Civil Rights Amendments Act of
2005, H.R. 88, 109th Cong. (2005); Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2003, H.R. 3285,
108th Cong. (2003); Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 1999, H.R. 2355, 106th Cong.
(1999); Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 1995, H.R. 1863, 104th Cong. (1995);
Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 1994, H.R. 1430, 103d Cong. (1994); Civil Rights
Amendments Act of 1989, S. 47, 101st Cong. (1989); Civil Rights Protection Act of 1988, S.
2109, 100th Cong. (1988); A Bill to Prohibit Employment Discrimination on the Basis of
Sexual Orientation, S. 430, 98th Cong. (1983); Civil Rights Amendments Act of 1981, H.R.
1454, 97th Cong. (1981); Civil Rights Amendments Act of 1977, H.R. 4794, 95th Cong.
(1977); Civil Rights Amendments Act, H.R. 13019, 94th Cong. (1976); Civil Rights
Amendments Act, H.R. 166, 94th Cong. (1975). In March 2019, the Equality Act (H.R. 5 and
S. 788, 116th Cong.) was introduced in Congress. The legislation would, among other things,
amend Title VII section 703(a) by striking “sex” and inserting “sex (including sexual
orientation and gender identity).” If enacted, the bill would be the first federal statute
prohibiting discrimination against LGBTQ persons. At least twenty-one states and the District
of Columbia have enacted laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation
and gender identity. See Non-Discrimination Laws, MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT,
https://www.lgbtmap.org/equality-maps/non_discrimination_laws [https://perma.cc/HM3LZR56].
150. Hively, 853 F.3d at 343–44. Failed attempts to change a statute “can mean almost
anything, ranging from the lack of necessity for a proposed change because the law already
accomplishes the desired goal, to the undesirability of the change because a majority of the
legislature is happy with the way the courts are currently interpreting the law, to the irrelevance
of the non-enactment, when it is attributable to nothing more than legislative logrolling or
gridlock that had nothing to do with [the] merits.” Id. Thus, “it is simply too difficult to draw
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disambiguation is the broader context of the statute that the legislature—in this case,
Congress—passed.”151
Noting but assuming no duty to defer to the EEOC’s 2015 determination that Title
VII’s sex discrimination prohibition encompasses sexual orientation
discrimination,152 Chief Judge Wood was guided by Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Services, Inc. and Justice Scalia’s pronouncement that “statutory prohibitions often
go beyond the principal evil[s] to cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is
ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our
legislators by which we are governed.”153 “The Court could not have been clearer”
Chief Judge Wood wrote: “the fact that the enacting Congress may not have
anticipated a particular application of the law cannot stand in the way of the
provisions of the law that are on the books.”154
It is thus “neither here nor there” that, in including “sex” as a prohibited basis for
employment discrimination in 1964, Congress “may not have realized or understood
the full scope of the words it chose. Indeed, in the years since 1964, Title VII has
been understood to cover far more than the simple decision of an employer not to
hire a woman for Job A, or a man for Job B.”155 The Court has held that the “because
of sex” provision prohibits workplace sexual harassment, including same-sex sexual
harassment;156 discrimination on the basis of actuarial assumptions about an
individual’s longevity;157 and discrimination because of a person’s failure to conform
to an employer’s gender stereotypes.158 While it is possible that these decisions
would have surprised those serving in the 88th Congress, “experience with the law
has led the Supreme Court to recognize that each of these examples is a covered form
of sex discrimination.”159

a reliable inference from these truncated legislative initiatives to rest our opinion on them. The
goalposts have been moving over the years, as the Supreme Court had shed more light on the
scope of the language that already is in the statute: no sex discrimination.” Id. at 344 (emphasis
in original).
151. Id.
152. Baldwin v. Foxx, EEOC No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641, at *4–5 (July 14, 2015)
(citing Price Waterhouse and concluding that sexual-orientation discrimination premised on
stereotypes, assumptions, norms, and expectations constitutes unlawful sex discrimination
because the employee has been treated less favorably because of her sex); see also Macy v.
Holder, EEOC No. 012012821, 2012 WL 1435995, at *9, *11 (Apr. 20, 2012) (intentional
transgender discrimination “is, by definition, discrimination ‘based on . . . sex,’” and therefore
violates Title VII; this is so even though members of the 1964 enacting Congress “were likely
not considering the problems of discrimination that were faced by transgender individuals . . .
.”). Agency decisions prior to Baldwin and Macy did not assert jurisdiction over employees’
complaints alleging that they had been discriminated against because they were gay. See
Johnson v. Frank, EEOC No. 05910850, 1991 WL 118760 (Dec. 19, 1991); Dillon v. Frank,
EEOC No. 01900157, 1990 WL 1111074 (Feb. 14, 1990).
153. 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998).
154. Hively, 853 F.3d at 345.
155. Id.
156. See supra notes 109–15 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 72–78 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 116–32 and accompanying text.
159. Hively, 853 F.3d at 345.
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In dissent, Judge Diane S. Sykes asked, “[i]s it even remotely plausible that in
1964, when Title VII was adopted, a reasonable person competent in the English
language would have understood that a law banning employment discrimination
‘because of sex’ also banned discrimination because of sexual orientation? The
answer is no, of course not.”160 Observing that Title VII does not define
discrimination “because of sex[,]”161 she looked for the “original public meaning” of
“sex” in dictionary definitions.162 In “1964—and now, for that matter—the word
‘sex’ mean[t] biologically male or female; it d[id] not also refer to sexual
orientation.”163 Accordingly, for a “fluent speaker of the English language—then and
now—the ordinary meaning of the word ‘sex’ does not fairly include the concept of
‘sexual orientation’” as the two terms are not interchangeable and do not overlap in
meaning.164
Judge Sykes’s original public meaning and dictionary-centered approach is
problematic in several respects. First, who is, and how does one identify, the posited
reasonable person competent in the English language? This reasonable person

160. Id. at 362 (Sykes, J., dissenting). Judge Sykes invoked the “fundamental canon of
statutory construction that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their
ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.” Id. (quoting Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 134 S.
Ct. 870, 876 (2014)). “Contemporary” means not now but at the time of the statute’s
enactment. Id.
161. See id.
162. See id. at 362–63. On judicial reliance on dictionaries in statutory interpretation, see
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., INTERPRETING LAW: A PRIMER ON HOW TO READ STATUTES AND
THE CONSTITUTION 44 (2016) (“Increasingly, judges are turning to dictionaries as external
evidence of what words might mean.”); id. at 59 (arguing that “the rule of law underpinning
of the ordinary meaning rule suggests that the dictionary meaning of any term should normally
be judged by current as well as historic dictionaries”); ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING
STATUTES 43 (2014) (stating that dictionaries can be helpful in interpreting statutes “especially
when dealing with . . . a word’s usage at the time of the law’s enactment”); SCALIA & GARNER,
supra note 111, at 415–24 (discussing the use of dictionaries in statutory interpretation). But
see Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 234 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (dictionaries are
“the last resort of the baffled judge”); RICHARD A. POSNER, REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING 200
(2013) (“Dictionaries are mazes in which judges are soon lost. A dictionary-centered
textualism is hopeless.”); Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory
Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 67 (1994) (a dictionary is a “museum of words
. . . rather than a means to decode the work of legislatures”).
163. Hively, 853 F.3d at 362 (Sykes, J., dissenting). Chief Judge Wood did not disagree
with Judge Sykes’s statement that “sexual orientation” was not defined by dictionaries at or
around the time of Title VII’s enactment. But “neither was . . . ‘sexual harassment’—a concept
that, although it can be distinguished from ‘sex,’ has at least since 1986 been included by the
Supreme Court under the umbrella of sex discrimination.” Id. at 350 n.5 (majority opinion).
164. Id. at 363 (Sykes, J., dissenting). Judge Richard A. Posner, calling for a “judicial
interpretive updating” approach, rejected what he called Judge Sykes’s “diehard originalist”
argument. Id. at 353 (Posner, J., concurring). In his view, the enactors of Title VII
“understandably didn’t understand . . . how attitudes toward homosexuals would change in the
following half century.” Id. at 357. He preferred that the court openly acknowledge that it was
imposing a meaning of “sex discrimination” that would not have been accepted by Congress
in 1964 rather than give “the impression that we are merely the obedient servants of the 88th
Congress (1963-1965)[] carrying out their wishes.” Id.

2020]

TI T LE VII A N D THE U N ENV IS A G ED CAS E

249

cannot be nonarbitrarily constructed[.] Is the person a he or a she? Does
he or she live in the city or the country? How much education and of
which kind has he or she had? How much information does he or she
possess about the law in question and the reasons behind its
promulgation, etc.?165
The inquiry into what this constructed person supposedly knows is an exercise in
interpretive creativity.
As for Judge Sykes’s reliance on dictionaries, great caution should be exercised
in determining the legal meaning of a statutory term by reference to dictionary
definitions or other lexicographical sources. A posited dictionary-based meaning of
the statutory term “sex,” based on a hypothetical reasonable person’s understanding
and usage of the term, may not shed useful interpretive and applicative light on legal
meaning and can render jurisprudentially irrelevant legislative, judicial, and
administrative agency uses and understandings of that term. That posited meaning
should not invisibilize and trump decades of judicial constructions of “sex” and the
Title VII phrase “because of sex.”
Second, and assuming for the sake of argument the interpretive relevance of
dictionaries,166 Judge Sykes’s dictionary analysis is “incomplete, at best.”167 As
Professor William Eskridge notes, the 1961 edition of Webster’s dictionary defined
“sex” in three ways: (1) “sex as biology” (male or female); (2) “sex as gender”
(masculine and feminine); and (3) “sex as sexuality” (“the whole sphere of behavior
related even indirectly to the sexual functions and embracing all affectionate and
pleasure-seeking conduct”).168 And other dictionaries in existence prior to the
enactment of Title VII did not limit “sex” to biological males and females and
included sex-as-gender and sex-as-sexuality definitions.169 All of which shows that
“the meaning of ‘sex’ in 1964 was not as one-dimensional as Judge Sykes
asserted.”170

165. Larry Alexander, Originalism, the Why and the What, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 539, 541
(2013); see also Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Originalism as a Legal Enterprise, 23 CONST.
COMMENT. 47, 73 (2006) (“[T]he reasonable person of the law . . . is highly intelligent and
educated and capable of making and recognizing subtle connections and inferences . . . [and]
is familiar with the peculiar language and conceptual structure of the law.”).
166. Judge Joel M. Flaum’s concurring opinion referred to dictionaries defining
“homosexuality” as sexual attraction to persons of the same sex. See Hively, 853 F.3d at 358
(Flaum, J., concurring). Noting that a person’s homosexuality cannot be considered without
accounting for that person’s sex, he concluded that an employer discriminating against an
employee because of that employee’s sexual attraction to a same-sex individual “is motivated,
in part, by an enumerated trait, the employee’s sex. That is all an employee must show to
successfully allege a Title VII claim.” Id. at 359.
167. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Title VII’s Statutory History and the Sex Discrimination
Argument for LGBT Workplace Protections, 127 YALE L.J. 322, 338 (2017).
168. Id. (citing and quoting WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 2296 (2d unabridged ed. 1961)).
169. See id. at 338 n.63 (citing THE AMERICAN COLLEGE DICTIONARY (Clarence L.
Barnhart ed. 1955)).
170. Id. at 339.
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Third, it is noteworthy that congressional drafters “do not use dictionaries.
Period.”171 This reality calls into question the view that “ordinary meaning is the
right lodestar from which to chart an interpretive path for statutory language.” 172 A
court’s dictionary-based determination of a reasonable person’s understanding of a
statutory term can import into the interpretive analysis sources not considered by
those who drafted the legislation and its at-issue provisions.
Fourth, Judge Sykes’s static and dictionary-based textualist approach does not
take into account changes in linguistic usage and context. Consider “property,” a
word that, in context, does not mean today what it meant in the past. At one time,
“property”
included a man’s right to his wife’s exclusive domestic and sexual
services, to the management of her property and the dictation of her
domicile, and to the labor of his children, apprentices, and . . . slaves, all
protected by law against strangers who would appropriate or interfere
with them . . . no lawyer or lay interpreter of the word ‘property’ would
take it to include any of those rights today. 173
Like “property,” the meaning of the Title VII term “sex” is not and should not be
restricted to a postulated frozen-in-time meaning with no consideration of postenactment linguistic usage, context, and judicial constructions. 174
2. Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc.
In Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc.,175 Donald Zarda, a gay man, was employed as
a skydiving instructor, a position in which he engaged in tandem skydives strapped
shoulder-to-shoulder and hip-to-hip with clients. Seeking to assuage any concerns a
female client may have had about being strapped to a male instructor, he told one
female client that he was gay and “had an ex-husband to prove it.”176 Zarda was
terminated after one dive when a female client alleged that he had inappropriately
touched her and disclosed his sexual orientation to her to excuse his behavior. Zarda

171. Abbe R. Gluck, Congress, Statutory Interpretation, and the Failure of Formalism:
The CBO Canon and Other Ways that Courts Can Improve on What They are Already Trying
to Do, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 177, 206 (2017); see also Abbe R. Gluck & Richard A. Posner,
Statutory Interpretation on the Bench: A Survey of Forty-Two Judges on the Federal Courts
of Appeals, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1298, 1318 (2018) (Congressional “drafters do not consult
dictionaries when drafting”).
172. James J. Brudney & Lawrence Baum, Oasis or Mirage: The Supreme Court’s Thirst
for Dictionaries in the Rehnquist and Roberts Eras, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 483, 574 (2013).
173. ROBERT W. GORDON, TAMING THE PAST: ESSAYS ON LAW IN HISTORY AND HISTORY IN
LAW 367 (2017). With regard to the view that a wife was her husband’s property, recall
Representative Katherine St. George’s statement during the 1964 House debates over the sex
amendment to Title VII: “women were chattels” who “belonged, first of all, to their fathers;
then to their husbands . . . .” 110 CONG. REC. 2581 (statement of Rep. St. George); see supra
note 39 and accompanying text.
174. Francis J. Mootz III, Judging Well, 11 WASH. U. JUR. REV. 1, 26 (2018).
175. 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018) (en banc).
176. Id. at 108 (bracket and citation omitted).
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brought a Title VII lawsuit alleging that he was fired because he failed to conform to
male sex stereotypes when he referred to his sexual orientation. Granting summary
judgment to the employer, the district court concluded that Zarda177 failed to establish
a prima facie case of gender stereotyping. On appeal, a Second Circuit panel held
that under the court’s precedents178 Zarda’s sexual-orientation discrimination claim
was not cognizable.179 After rehearing en banc, the court affirmed in part, vacated in
part, and remanded the case to the district court.
Chief Judge Robert A. Katzmann’s majority opinion focused on judicial
precedent and the text of Title VII, in particular the phrase “because of sex” and
Section 703(m)’s “motivating factor” causation standard.180 He observed that the
Supreme Court has held that Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex
itself, as well as “traits that are a function of sex, such as life expectancy . . . and
nonconformity with gender norms . . . .”181 Citing Oncale, the Chief Judge reasoned
that application of the statute to such traits is consistent with the Court’s view that
Title VII covers both the principal evils with which Congress was concerned in 1964,
as well as “reasonably comparable evils” meeting the statute’s requirements. 182
Chief Judge Katzmann then determined that the “most natural reading” of Title
VII’s sex discrimination ban “is that it extends to sexual orientation . . . because sex
is necessarily a factor in sexual orientation.” 183 Operationalizing the Black’s Law
Dictionary’s definition of “sexual orientation” (a “person’s predisposition or
inclination toward sexual activity or behavior with other males or females”) 184 and
citing Judge Flaum’s Hively concurrence,185 Chief Judge Katzmann opined that
identifying a person’s sexual orientation requires knowledge of that person’s sex and
the sex of the person he or she is attracted to; that double delineation led him to
conclude that “sexual orientation is a function of sex and sex is a protected
characteristic under Title VII . . . .”186
Chief Judge Katzmann turned to the argument made by Judge Sykes in her Hively
dissent: that it is not remotely plausible that in 1964 a reasonable person competent
in the English language would have understood that Title VII’s sex discrimination

177. After filing suit, Zarda died in a jumping accident and the executors of his estate
substituted as plaintiffs. Id. at 107 n.1.
178. See Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211 (2d Cir. 2005), overruled by Zarda,
883 F.3d 100; Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33 (2d Cir. 2000), overruled by Zarda, 883 F.3d
100; see also Christiansen v. Omnicom Group, Inc., 852 F.3d 195, 202 (2d Cir. 2017)
(Katzmann, C.J., concurring) (expressing his view that the court should revisit Simonton and
Dawson “especially in light of the changing legal landscape that has taken shape in the nearly
two decades since Simonton issued”).
179. See Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 855 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2017), rehearing en banc
granted May 25, 2017, aff’d in part, vacated in part, and remanded, 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir.
2018) (en banc).
180. See Zarda, 883 F.3d at 112; supra note 132.
181. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 112 (citations omitted).
182. Id. (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998)).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 113 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014)).
185. Id. (citing Hively, 853 F.3d at 358 (Flaum, J., concurring)); see supra note 166 and
accompanying text.
186. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 113.
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ban also prohibited sexual-orientation discrimination. 187 As did Chief Judge Wood
in Hively, Chief Judge Katzmann responded that the same could be said of other
forms of discrimination initially believed to fall outside of the statute’s protective
umbrella and “not necessarily obvious from the face of the statute[,]” 188 such as
sexual harassment and unlawful hostile work environments. As Congress cannot
anticipate “the full spectrum of employment discrimination that would be directed at
the protected categories, it falls to courts to give effect to the broad language
Congress used.”189
Dissenting Judge Gerard E. Lynch’s analysis was premised on his understanding
of the legislative commitment to the principles of the enacted words chosen by
Congress, “illuminated by an understanding of the central public meaning of the
language used in the statute at the time of its enactment.”190 Looking beyond the
legislative history of the Title VII sex amendment191 to the broader political and
social history of that provision, he argued that the sex discrimination ban “was
intended to eliminate workplace inequalities that held women back from advancing
in the economy,” just as the statute sought to protect African Americans and other
racial, national, and religious minorities from workplace discrimination. 192 The
statutory language “would have been so understood” by members of Congress and
“by any politically engaged citizen deciding whether to urge his or her
representatives to vote for” the sex discrimination amendment. 193 On the eve of the
passage of historic legislation addressing racial discrimination against African
Americans “women in effect stood up and said ‘us, too,’ and Congress agreed.”194
Judge Lynch’s understanding of the “central public meaning” of Title VII at the
time of its enactment introduces extratextual elements into the interpretive calculus:
congressional intent, the political and social history of the sex discrimination
amendment, the understanding of Members of Congress as well as politically
engaged citizens (who they are is not specified), and congressional agreement with
women who said (in effect and not in actuality) “us, too.” Judge Lynch’s focus and
reliance on congressional intent is reminiscent of subjective intentionalism
discredited by Justice Scalia and others,195 and the other elements he mentions are

187. Id. at 114; see supra note 160 and accompanying text.
188. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 114.
189. Id. at 115 (citation omitted).
190. Id. at 144 (footnote omitted) (Lynch, J., dissenting); see also id. at 143 (referring to
the “fundamental public meaning of the language of the Civil Rights Act”) (emphasis in
original). Judge Lynch also noted that the political context of proposed legislation and the way
that language is or is not used in public debate can be helpful in understanding statutory
meaning. See id. at 144 n.8.
191. See supra Part I.
192. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 145 (Lynch, J., dissenting).
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 111, at 30 (“describing the interpretive exercise as
a search for ‘intent’ inevitably causes readers to think of subjective intent, as opposed to the
objective words that the drafters agreed to in their expression of rights and duties”) (emphasis
in original); Frank B. Cross, Shattering the Fragile Case for Judicial Review of Rulemaking,
85 VA. L. REV. 1243, 1259 (1999) (intentionalism has been discredited); Jane S. Schacter, The
Pursuit of “Popular Intent”: Interpretive Dilemmas in Direct Democracy, 105 YALE L.J. 107,
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rife with opportunities for interpreter discretion and judicial creativity not tethered to
the language of the statute itself at the time of its enactment.
Responding to Chief Judge Katzmann’s observation that Title VII prohibits
certain conduct and practices not contemplated by Congress when the statute was
enacted in 1964, Judge Lynch argued that unanticipated consequences do “not
support extending Title VII by judicial construction to protect an entirely different
category of people.”196 Outlawing sexual harassment and hostile work environments
says nothing about whether the statute covers discrimination on other bases, he
contended. The “political reality” is that Title VII does not mandate equal protection
in the workplace; rather, the statute prohibits discrimination based on specified
categories and classifications. Groups that successfully persuaded a majority of
Congress that they should be protected from discriminatory treatment were included
in the protected categories listed in the statute; those who did not achieve that
political goal were not.197 Thus, he hypothesized, if Representative Smith’s “sex”
amendment had been defeated Title VII would have only provided workplace
protection on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin. “But it would not
have protected women,” a fact that would not have changed “without legislative
action.”198 “Congress is permitted to choose what types of social problems to attack
and by which means”; in 1964, it did not choose to prohibit sexual-orientation
discrimination.199
This counterfactual is not helpful. We know that Representative Smith’s
amendment was not defeated and that Congress chose to prohibit discrimination
“because of . . . sex.” The legal meaning of that phrase has not been frozen in amber
such that cases unenvisaged and unanticipated in 1964 (for example, sexual
harassment and hostile work environment claims) are beyond the statute’s scope and
reach.
3. Bostock v. Clayton County Board of Commissioners
The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Bostock v. Clayton County Board of
Commissioners200 reviewed a district court’s dismissal of Gerald Lynn Bostock’s
sexual-orientation discrimination claim. In a four-paragraph per curiam opinion, the
appeals court agreed with the district court that the case was governed by the Fifth
Circuit’s pre-Price Waterhouse 1979 decision in Blum v. Gulf Oil Corporation
holding that “[d]ischarge for homosexuality is not prohibited by Title VII . . . .”201

110 (1995) (intentionalism “has long been discredited by scholars”).
196. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 145 (Lynch, J., dissenting).
197. See id. at 147.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 148.
200. 723 F. App’x 964 (11th Cir. 2018) (per curiam), reh’g en banc denied, 894 F.3d 1335
(11th Cir. 2018).
201. 597 F.2d 936, 938 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam). Blum was decided by the Eleventh
Circuit’s predecessor, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The Eleventh
Circuit adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the Fifth Circuit issued before the close
of business on September 30, 1981. See Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th
Cir. 1981) (en banc).
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Blum’s binding status was also recently confirmed by the Eleventh Circuit’s decision
in Evans v. Georgia Regional Hospital.202
B. Gender Nonconformity Discrimination
1. Hively
Viewing the sexual-orientation discrimination issue through the lens of gender
nonconformity law, Chief Judge Wood wrote that Kimberly Hively “represents the
ultimate case of failure to conform to the female stereotype (at least as understood in
a place such as modern America, which views heterosexuality as the norm and other
forms of sexuality as exceptional): she is not heterosexual.”203 That employers may
not lawfully police the boundaries of behaviors acceptable for women was the critical
point made by the Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins204 and by the
Seventh Circuit in a 1971 decision wherein the court stated that Title VII applies to
the “entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex
stereotypes.”205 Chief Judge Wood explained that in both of those cases the
challenged employer actions did not affect every female employee. Likewise, a
policy discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation “does not affect every
woman, or every man, but it is based on assumptions about the proper behavior for

202. 850 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 557 (2017). The Evans court
deemed itself bound by Blum unless and until that decision was overruled by the Eleventh
Circuit or the Supreme Court. Id. at 1255. Judge William H. Pryor, Jr., concurring, opined that
although plaintiffs alleging gender nonconformity discrimination will often experience sexualorientation discrimination, under Title VII the only question asked is whether the individual
experienced discrimination for deviating from a gender stereotype. Citing two magazine
articles referring in the titles to the authors’ choice to be gay, Judge Pryor wrote, “Some gay
individuals adopt what various commentators have referred to as the gay ‘social identity’ but
experience a variety of sexual desires.” Id. at 1259 (Pryor, J., concurring) (citing E.J. Graff,
What’s Wrong with Choosing to Be Gay?, NATION (Feb. 3, 2014),
https://www.thenation.com/article/whats-wrong-choosing-be-gay/ [https://perma.cc/M787ML3A]). Drawing a line between the behavior and status of a person claiming gender
nonconformity discrimination, Judge Pryor argued that Price Waterhouse concerned behavior
and not status. “Status-based protections must stem from a separate doctrine or directly from
the text of Title VII.” Id. at 1260. The statute’s enumeration of protected characteristics does
not include sexual orientation and the argument that that status should be a protected class
should be pressed in Congress and not in courts. See id. at 1260–61. Judge Pryor’s colleague,
Judge Robin S. Rosenbaum, pointed out that his arbitrary line between behavior and status
would protect an “outwardly lesbian plaintiff” but not a “lesbian who is private about her
sexuality.” Id. at 1267 (Rosenbaum, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The
employer “smart enough to say only that it thought that the employee was a lesbian” could fire
a female employee perceived to be a lesbian without identifying the basis for that conclusion.
Id. This behavior-status analysis does not “comport with the lived experiences of gay, lesbian,
and bisexual persons” and creates “‘fictional gays’ to justify excluding LGB people from Title
VII’s protections.” Anthony Michael Kreis, Against Gay Potemkin Villages: Title VII and
Sexual Orientation Discrimination, 96 TEX. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 8 (2017).
203. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 346 (7th Cir. 2017).
204. 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989); see supra Section I.C.
205. Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971).
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someone of a given sex.”206 When an employer acts on those assumptions it takes
into account and has reacted to “the victim’s biological sex (either as observed at
birth or as modified, in the case of transsexuals) . . . .”207
Judge Sykes, dissenting, argued that Price Waterhouse only held that “sex
stereotyping” can be evidence of sex discrimination and did not establish such
stereotyping as a “doctrine” or “theory”208 or an independent cause of action.209
Seeing nothing in Price Waterhouse casting doubt on the distinction between sex
discrimination and sexual-orientation discrimination, she thought it plain that
“heterosexuality is not a female stereotype; it is not a male stereotype; it is not a sexspecific stereotype at all.”210
It is true that Justice Brennan’s plurality opinion in Price Waterhouse did not
expressly label his sex-stereotyping analysis as doctrinal or theoretical or as
establishing an independent cause of action. That does not change the fact that he
clearly and unequivocally declared that employers cannot discriminatorily assume or
insist that employees match their employers’ stereotypes.211 Nor does it invisiblize
concurring Justice O’Connor’s conclusion in Price Waterhouse that Ann Hopkins
proved that her employer’s sex stereotyping played a significant role in the decision
not to invite her into the partnership.212 For these reasons, Judge Sykes’s observations
do not fairly call into question the Court’s three-decades-old precedent as applied to
the sexual-orientation discrimination issue.213
2. Zarda
Also viewing the sexual-orientation discrimination issue through the genderstereotyping/nonconformity lens, Chief Judge Katzmann argued that sexualorientation discrimination is “almost invariably rooted in stereotypes about men and
women.”214 Applying Price Waterhouse, he concluded that when “‘an employer acts
on the basis of a belief that men cannot be attracted to men, or that they must not be,’
but takes no action against women who are attracted to men, the employer ‘has acted
on the basis of gender.’ . . . The gender stereotype at work here is that ‘real’ men
should date women, and not other men.”215

206. Hively, 853 F.3d at 346.
207. Id. at 346–47.
208. Id. at 369 (Sykes, J., dissenting). But see Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No.
1 Bd. of Educ., 858 F.3d 1034, 1049 (7th Cir. 2017) (referring to the Price Waterhouse “sexstereotyping theory”); Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 572 (6th Cir. 2004) (noting the
Price Waterhouse “theory of sex stereotyping”).
209. Hively, 853 F.3d at 369 (Sykes, J., dissenting).
210. Id. at 370.
211. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
212. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
213. For more on these points, see infra notes 312–15 and accompanying text.
214. Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 119 (2d Cir. 2018).
215. Id. at 120–21 (alterations omitted) (citations omitted) (quoting Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989)).
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Amicus U.S. Department of Justice216 argued that Price Waterhouse does not
prohibit sex-stereotyping/sexual-orientation discrimination because women are
treated no worse than men. Reading Price Waterhouse in conjunction with Oncale,
Chief Judge Katzmann responded that Price Waterhouse “could not have defended
itself by claiming that it fired a gender-nonconforming man as well as a gendernonconforming woman any more than it could persuasively argue that two wrongs
make a right.”217 The two wrongs would doubly violate Title VII in that both men
and women would be discriminated against on the basis of gender stereotypes. 218
Dissenting Judge Lynch fully accepted the view that discrimination based on “a
normative belief about how all women should be” imposes different working
conditions on men and women and is therefore prohibited by Title VII: the systematic
disadvantaging of one sex is the “key element” in the finding that sexual stereotyping
is sex discrimination.219 But he did not agree that a homophobic employer’s
stereotypes regarding men or women disadvantaged either sex. The homophobic
employer who disapproves of the behavior of a class of persons including both men
and women does not act on “a belief about what men or women ought to be or do; it
is a belief about what all people ought to be or do—to be heterosexual and to have
sexual attraction to or relations with only members of the opposite sex.”220 In his
view, that kind of discrimination is not better or worse than other kinds of
discrimination, but it is “something different from sex discrimination” and is
therefore not prohibited by Title VII.221
C. Associational Discrimination
Another rationale offered by the Seventh and Second Circuits in support of
recognition of a Title VII sexual-orientation discrimination claim likened such
discrimination to the prohibition and criminalization of interracial marriages in
Loving v. Virginia.222 In that canonical decision, issued three years after the
enactment of Title VII, the Court invalidated Virginia’s white supremacist antimiscegenation laws.223 In doing so, the Court rejected Virginia’s argument that those

216. The DOJ, supporting the employer, and the EEOC, supporting Zarda, submitted
separate amicus briefs to the Second Circuit. Id. at 116 n.12.
217. Id. at 123.
218. See id. Chief Judge Katzmann also rejected the DOJ’s argument that an employer’s
negative views about same-sex sexual attraction based not on gender but on its moral beliefs
would not violate Title VII. That argument “merely begs the question by assuming that moral
beliefs about sexual orientation can be disassociated from beliefs about sex. Because sexual
orientation is a function of sex, this is simply impossible.” Id. at 122.
219. Id. at 158 (Lynch, J., dissenting). Disagreeing with Judge Lynch on this point, Chief
Judge Katzmann noted that Title VII “does not ask whether a particular sex is discriminated
against; it asks whether a particular ‘individual’ is discriminated against ‘because of such
individual’s . . . sex.’” Id. at 123 n.23 (majority opinion).
220. Id. at 158 (Lynch, J., dissenting).
221. Id.
222. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
223. “The fact that Virginia prohibits only interracial marriages involving white persons
demonstrates that the racial classifications must stand on their own justification, as measures
designed to maintain White Supremacy.” Id. at 11.
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laws did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution224
since the interracial marriage proscription applied to both the African-American and
white participants in the marriage. The “fact of equal application does not immunize
the statute from the very heavy burden of justification” required by the Equal
Protection Clause when government draws racial lines. 225
1. Hively
Chief Judge Wood, invoking Loving, observed, “society understands now” that
anti-miscegenation laws “are (and always were) inherently racist.” 226 She compared
interracial marriage bans and discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation: an
African American discriminated against because of his or her marriage to a white
person would not have been discriminated against if he or she had married an African
American; a woman who had or preferred intimate relations with a woman would
not be discriminated against if she had or preferred such a relationship with a man.227
In the racial discrimination and Title VII context, courts have applied the
associational discrimination theory in holding that employers engaging in such
conduct unlawfully discriminated on the basis of race.228 In the sexual-orientation
discrimination and Title VII context, courts should likewise apply the theory and
hold that an adverse action based on the employer’s disapproval of same-sex
associations discriminates against a plaintiff-employee because of her sex.
Disagreeing with Chief Judge Wood’s invocation of Loving,229 Judge Sykes
argued that the inherently racist anti-miscegenation laws at issue in Loving are
different from sexual-orientation discrimination that is “not inherently sexist. No one
argues that sexual-orientation discrimination aims to promote or perpetuate the
supremacy of one sex.”230 This view, in the words of Professor Brian Soucek, is

224. Id. at 12; see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
225. Loving, 388 U.S. at 9; see also McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964)
(“Judicial inquiry under the Equal Protection Clause . . . does not end with a showing of equal
application among the members of the class defined by the legislation. The courts must reach
and determine the question whether the classifications drawn in a statute are reasonable in
light of its purpose . . . .”).
226. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 348 (7th Cir. 2017).
227. See id. at 349; see also Samuel A. Marcosson, Harassment on the Basis of Sexual
Orientation: A Claim of Sex Discrimination Under Title VII, 81 GEO. L.J. 1, 5 (1992).
228. See Hively, 853 F.3d at 348 (quoting Holcomb v. Iona Coll., 521 F.3d 130, 139 (2d
Cir. 2008)) (“[W]here an employee is subjected to adverse action because an employer
disapproves of interracial association, the employee suffers discrimination because of the
employee’s own race”); Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 888, 892 (11th
Cir. 1986) (a plaintiff’s discrimination claim “based upon an interracial marriage or
association” alleges, “by definition, that he has been discriminated against because of his
race”); see also Drake v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 134 F.3d 878, 884 (7th Cir. 1998)
(assuming for the sake of argument that an associational race discrimination claim is
actionable where white employees brought a Title VII action alleging that they were subjected
to a hostile work environment because they associated with African-American coworkers).
229. As did Judge Posner: in his view, Loving “had nothing to do with the recently enacted
Title VII.” Hively, 853 F.3d at 356 (Posner, J., concurring).
230. Id. at 368 (Sykes, J., dissenting). But see Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d
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“astonishingly, flamboyantly wrong.”231 As he notes, “it would be nearly impossible
even to glance at the queer and gender theory or antidiscrimination scholarship of
the last two decades without encountering the notion that sexual orientation
discrimination has something to do with the subordination of women.” 232 Sexism is
“the ideology of male supremacy and superiority over women,”233 and men and boys
use homophobic slurs to establish and enforce hierarchies in which women are at the
bottom.234 In both the white-supremacist anti-miscegenation and male-supremacist
sexual-orientation contexts, discrimination is triggered and fueled by disapproval of
certain associations and relationships.
2. Zarda
Zarda agreed with the Seventh Circuit that employment discrimination based on
an employee’s associations is discrimination on the basis of sex. The court had
previously recognized associational discrimination as a violation of Title VII’s race
discrimination prohibition in Holcomb v. Iona College235 as have other federal courts
of appeals.236 In addition, the Sixth and Seventh Circuits have extended the theory
beyond race to claims of color, religion, sex, and national origin. 237 Agreeing with
those decisions, Chief Judge Katzmann declared, “we now hold that the prohibition
on associational discrimination applies with equal force to all the classes protected
by Title VII, including sex.”238 He explained that if a male employee who is married
to a man is fired because his employer disapproves of same-sex marriage, the
employee “has suffered associational discrimination based on his own sex” because
the employer was motivated by the fact that the employee is a man instead of a
woman.239 The employer cannot avoid that conclusion by requiring men and women
to refrain from same-sex relationships and attractions. If an African-American
employee and his white wife, who was also an employee, were both fired for their
association, it “is unthinkable” that the discrimination “would be excused because
two employees of different races were both victims of an anti-miscegenation

100, 160 (2d Cir. 2018) (Lynch, J., dissenting) (“It is certainly plausible to me that the ‘deep
roots’ of hostility to homosexuals are in some way related to the same sorts of beliefs about
the proper role of men and women in family life that underlie at least some employment
discrimination against women.”); Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 830 F.3d 698, 711
(7th Cir. 2016) (“There is, of course, a considerable overlap in the origins of sex discrimination
and homophobia, and so it is not surprising that sexist and homophonic epithets often go hand
in hand.”).
231. Brian Soucek, Hively’s Self-Induced Blindness, 127 YALE L.J. F. 115, 121 (2017).
232. Id.; see also id. at 123 n.36.
233. Gila Stopler, “A Rank Usurpation of Power”–The Role of Patriarchal Religion and
Culture in the Subordination of Women, 15 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 365, 380 (2008).
234. See Nancy Chi Cantalupo, Masculinity & Title IX: Bullying and Sexual Harassment
of Boys in the American Liberal State, 73 MD. L. REV. 887, 965 (2014).
235. 521 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2008).
236. See, e.g., Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 124 (2d Cir. 2018).
237. See id. at 124–25 and cases cited therein.
238. Id. at 125.
239. Id.
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workplace policy. The same is true of discrimination based on sexual orientation.” 240
Reinforcing this conclusion with the reasoning of Loving,241 the Chief Judge
extended the Loving court’s rejection of the equal application defense 242 to
associations based on sex. 243
Amici supporting the employer argued that Loving and Holcomb should not be
applied to same-sex relationships because anti-miscegenation policies are motivated
by racism while sexual orientation discrimination is not rooted in sexism. And amici
supporting Zarda contended that “sexual orientation discrimination has deep
misogynistic roots.”244 Chief Judge Katzmann did not resolve this disagreement
because the employer’s amici did not identify any cases liming the scope of Title
VII’s sex discrimination ban to “discrimination motivated by what would
colloquially be described as sexism.”245 In his view, that approach is foreclosed by
the Oncale court’s recognition of a cause of action for male-on-male harassment
which is “well outside the bounds of what is traditionally conceptualized as sexism,”
and by the Manhart court’s invalidation of a policy requiring female employees to
make higher pension contributions than their male counterparts because women
generally live longer than men, even though “some people might not describe this
policy as sexist.”246 In any event, the position that sexual-orientation discrimination
“does not evince conventional notions of sexism . . . is not a legitimate basis for
concluding that it does not constitute discrimination ‘because of . . . sex.’” 247
Additionally, Chief Judge Katzmann observed that the Supreme Court has
rejected the fallback argument made by opponents of the associational discrimination
approach—that such discrimination can be based only on acts and not on the status
of sexual orientation.248 That argument fails to comprehend that a Title VII claim
originates in a challenge to employer discrimination based on an individual’s status
(a protected characteristic) and not an act.249
Presenting a different analysis of the associational discrimination theory, Judge
Lynch’s dissent opined that the associational discrimination at issue in Loving and
Holcomb “was a product of bigotry against a single race by another” that “is
expressly prohibited in employment by Title VII.”250 Sexual-orientation
discrimination is not the same, he argued, as Donald Zarda did not and could not
plausibly allege that his employer discriminated against him because the employer
“had something against men, and therefore discriminated not only against men, but
also against anyone, male or female, who associated with them.”251 He maintained

240. Id. at 125–26.
241. “Constitutional cases like Loving ‘can provide helpful guidance in the statutory
context’ of Title VII.” Id. at 126 (quoting Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 582 (2009)).
242. See supra notes 221–24 and accompanying text.
243. See Zarda, 883 F.3d at 126.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 127.
247. Id.
248. See id.
249. See id. at 128.
250. Id. at 159 (Lynch, J., dissenting).
251. Id. at 160.
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that an employer discriminating against gay men is hostile to gay men and not men
generally, and the animus runs, not against a protected group as in race cases, but
“against an (alas) unprotected group to which they belong: other gay men.”252
The flaw in this analysis is Judge Lynch’s focus on the person with whom the
plaintiff associates instead of the plaintiff who suffered discrimination because the
employer did not approve of the association. The employer’s animus in the racial
discrimination context did not run “against all black people (or all white people) but
against people marrying persons of a different race. “That maps squarely onto
[Zarda’s] case where the prejudice is not against all men, but people being attracted
to persons of the same sex.”253
Judge Lynch argued, further, that his analysis of associational discrimination is
not foreclosed by Oncale, for he was not maintaining that Title VII prohibits only
those practices with which the framers of the statute might have been principally
concerned. He was not surprised that courts have interpreted Title VII to prohibit
sexual harassment as that conduct obstructs women’s entry into and advancement in
the workplace.254 “[I]t does not matter whether the victim is male or female”; what
matters is that the victim “is selected by his or her sex” and is disadvantaged because
of his or her membership in the protected class.255 This “is not a question of what is
traditionally conceptualized as sexism . . . . It is a question of the public meaning of
the words adopted by Congress in light of the social problem it was addressing when
it chose those words.”256
Judge Lynch’s contention that sexual harassment is not a question of sexism is
troubling. Sexual harassment is more about sexism than sex, 257 includes a number of
forms of sexism and abuse,258 and “is a technology of sexism. It is a disciplinary
practice that inscribes, enforces, and polices the identities of both harasser and victim
according to a system of gender norms . . . .”259 Admittedly, sexism may not be an
aspect of the factual backdrop of every harassment claim. But if harassment meets
Title VII’s “because of sex” requirement, “why the harassment was perpetuated
(sexual interest? misogyny? personal vendetta? misguided humor? boredom?) is
beside the point.”260

252. Id.
253. Id. at 126 n.28 (majority opinion).
254. See id. at 161 (Lynch, J., dissenting).
255. Id. at 161–62.
256. Id. at 162.
257. Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, Again, 128 YALE L.J.F. 22, 22
(2018).
258. See Vicki Schultz, Open Statement on Sexual Harassment from Employment
Discrimination Law Scholars, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 17, 20 (2018).
259. Katherine M. Franke, What’s Wrong with Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REV. 691,
693 (1997); see also Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment, 83
CORNELL L. REV. 1169, 1220 (1998) (“[S]exual harassment as a practice [is] rooted in a
struggle between men and women in the workplace that perpetuates both male control and the
primacy of conventionally masculine norms, that genders both men and women through a
variety of dynamics commensurate with their individual and subgroup based variations, and
that interferes with the capacity both to define oneself as a subject to and to seek less
stereotypic or confining roles.”).
260. Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 578 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. granted and
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***
The Hively and Zarda majorities and dissents reached contrary conclusions about
the meaning of “because of sex” as applied to plaintiffs’ claims that they were
discriminated against because of their sexual orientation. These differences are the
product of markedly different interpretive approaches yielding, unsurprisingly,
conflicting statutory interpretations. Recognizing an anti-LGB claim, the Hively and
Zarda side of the interpretive divide looked to statutory text and juridical and
doctrinal developments occurring over the past fifty-five years. Declining to
recognize the claim, the dissenting judges on the other side of the divide insisted that
the original or central public meaning of “sex” in 1964 is the unchanged meaning of
“sex” today. As that meaning does not refer to or include “sexual orientation,” the
Title VII phrase “because of sex” does not encompass anti-LGB discrimination. And
the Eleventh Circuit’s not-actionable position in Bostock, adhering to binding circuit
precedent, did not engage with the various rationales offered and disputed in Hively
and Zarda. This split in authority will remain absent Supreme Court resolution of
these conflicting constructions of Title VII.
IV. TRANSGENDER DISCRIMINATION: BECAUSE OF SEX?
A. EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc.
Aimee Stephens, assigned male at birth, lived and presented as a man while
working at R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes. Her employment was terminated
after she informed the funeral home’s director that she intended to transition from
male to female and would present and dress as a woman while at work. Stephens was
fired, according to the director, because she “was no longer going to represent
himself as a man. He wanted to dress as a woman.”261 The EEOC filed a complaint
alleging that the employer violated Title VII by terminating Stephens’s employment
because of her transgender and/or transitioning status and refusal to conform to sexbased stereotypes. The district court granted the employer’s motion to dismiss the
transgender discrimination claim on the ground that transgender status is not a
protected trait under Title VII but denied the motion to dismiss the sex
stereotyping/gender nonconformity claim.262 In deciding the parties’ cross-motions
for summary judgment, the district court concluded that although there was direct
evidence supporting Stephens’s sex-stereotyping claim, the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act263 precluded the EEOC’s enforcement of Title VII.264
The Sixth Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Karen Nelson Moore, agreed with the
district court that Stephens was fired because she failed to conform to the employer’s
sex stereotypes. The appeals court disagreed, however, with the district court’s

judgment vacated, 523 U.S. 1001 (1998).
261. EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560, 569 (6th Cir. 2018).
262. See EEOC v. R.G. & G.R Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 3d 594, 595 (E.D.
Mich. 2015).
263. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb(1)–(6) (2012).
264. See EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 3d 837 (E.D.
Mich. 2016), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, and remanded, 884 F.3d 590.
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conclusion that Stephens could not alternatively pursue a discrimination claim based
on her transgender and/or transitioning status.
With respect to the sex-stereotyping claim, Judge Moore was guided by the Sixth
Circuit’s decision in Smith v. City of Salem.265 The Smith court, basing its analysis
on the Supreme Court’s Price Waterhouse ruling, held that a transgender person who
was subjected to adverse working conditions after “he began to express a more
feminine appearance and manner on a regular basis” could sue the employer under
Title VII because the challenged “discrimination would not have occurred but for the
employee’s sex.”266 Firing Stephens because she “‘wanted to dress as a woman’ . . .
falls squarely within the ambit of sex-based discrimination that Price Waterhouse
and Smith forbid.”267
The funeral homes argued that sex stereotyping violates Title VII only when it
results in the disparate treatment of men and women. Not persuaded, Judge Moore
pointed out that Smith did not ask whether transgender persons transitioning from
male to female were treated differently than transgender persons transitioning from
female to male; rather, the court asked whether a transgender person had been
discriminated against because of the failure to conform to the employer’s stereotype
regarding how a man should look and behave.268 On that view, an employer’s
expectation of conformity by both male and female employees violates Title VII.269
With respect to the transgender/transitioning status claim, the EEOC and
Stephens270 argued that transgender discrimination is always based on the gender
stereotype that individuals will conform their behavior and appearance to their birthassigned sex (for example, their dress and the name they use).271 The employer
countered that the Title VII word “sex” “refers to a binary characteristic for which
there are only two classifications, male and female,” which arise “in a person based
on their chromosomally driven physiology and reproductive function,” and that
transgender status refers to a person’s “self-assigned” gender identity and not their
sex.272
For two reasons, Judge Moore concluded that Stephens and the EEOC had the
better argument. First, it is “analytically impossible to fire an employee based on that
employee’s status as a transgender person without being motivated, at least in part,
by the employee’s sex.”273 Second, “discrimination against transgender persons
necessarily implicates Title VII’s proscriptions against sex stereotyping.”274 As a

265. 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004).
266. Id. at 572, 574; see also Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1320 (6th Cir. 2011)
(holding that discrimination against an individual based on his or her gender nonconformity is
sex-based discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause).
267. Harris Funeral Homes, 884 F.3d at 572.
268. Id. at 574; Smith, 378 F.3d at 572.
269. See Harris Funeral Homes, 884 F.3d at 574.
270. Stephens successfully moved to intervene in the appeal of the district court’s decision
because she was concerned that changed policy priorities in the federal government may have
prevented the EEOC from fully representing her interests. See id. at 570.
271. See id. at 575.
272. Id. (quoting employer’s brief).
273. Id.
274. Id. at 576.
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transgender person is inherently gender nonconforming, discrimination on that basis
imposes “stereotypical notions of how sexual organs and gender identity ought to
align”; such discrimination cannot be disaggregated from discrimination on the basis
of gender nonconformity.275
Judge Moore also rejected the employer’s physiology, reproductive, and selfassigned gender identity argument. “[T]he drafters’ failure to anticipate that Title VII
would cover transgender status is of little interpretive value.”276 Governed as we are
by the provisions of Title VII and not the principal concerns of legislators, 277
congressional failure to foresee the case of transgender discrimination does not place
that form of discrimination beyond the reach of the statute.278 As Judge Moore
concluded, this argument is precluded by Smith and has been “eviscerated by Price
Waterhouse.”279
Judge Moore considered an additional employer argument: transgender status is
not unique to one biological sex as both biologically male and biologically female
persons can be transgender.280 That is true, Judge Moore said, as biological sex and
transgender status are not coterminous; however, “a trait need not be exclusive to
one sex to nevertheless be a function of sex.”281 As Chief Judge Katzmann explained
in Zarda, Title VII asks not “whether a particular sex is discriminated against,” but
“whether a particular ‘individual’ is discriminated against ‘because of such
‘individual’s’ . . . sex.’”282 To reiterate, discrimination against an employee because
of her transgender status takes into account her biological sex; therefore, that
discrimination “necessarily entails discrimination on the basis of sex—no matter
what sex the employee was born or wishes to be.”283
Accordingly, the court held that that the EEOC could pursue its claim that the
employer discriminated against Stephens on the basis of her transgender status and
transitioning identity.
B. Wittmer v. Phillips 66 Company
A recent Fifth Circuit decision, notable for its concurring opinion, warrants
mention. Wittmer v. Phillips 66 Company284 considered Nicole Wittmer’s appeal of
the district court’s dismissal of her suit alleging that her employer violated Title VII
when it rescinded an offer of employment because of her identity as a transgender
woman and her failure to conform to female sex stereotypes. 285 Noting Hively, Zarda,

275. Id. at 576–77.
276. Id. at 577.
277. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998)).
278. See id. (citing Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79).
279. Harris Funeral Homes, 884 F.3d at 578.
280. See id.
281. Id.
282. Id. (quoting Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 123 n.23 (2d Cir. 2018)
(en banc) (plurality opinion)).
283. Id.
284. 915 F.3d 328 (5th Cir. 2019).
285. See Wittmer v. Phillips 66 Co., 304 F. Supp. 3d 627, 632, 637 (S.D. Tex. 2018), aff’d
on other grounds, 915 F.3d 328 (5th Cir. 2019).
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and Harris Funeral Homes, the district court assumed that Title VII protected
Wittmer.286 However, summary judgment was granted to the employer on the ground
that Wittmer failed to establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination. 287
When the case was appealed to the Fifth Circuit, the employer did not take a
position on the question whether Title VII prohibits transgender discrimination. 288
Judge James C. Ho’s opinion for the court affirmed the district court’s ruling that
Wittmer had not demonstrated a prima face case of sex discrimination.289 He also
concluded that binding Fifth Circuit precedent in Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp.290
foreclosed Wittmer’s claim.291 Although Blum held that “[d]ischarge for
homosexuality is not prohibited by Title VII,”292 Judge Ho applied that sexualorientation discrimination ruling to Wittmer’s separate and distinct transgender
discrimination claim.293
Judge Ho also issued a separate concurring opinion explaining why, in his view,
the court’s precedent is “correct as matter of faithful interpretation.”294 “As a matter
of ordinary usage, the term ‘sex,’ of course, does not mean ‘sexual orientation’ or
‘transgender status.’”295 Citing Judge Sykes’s Hively dissent, he stated that in 1964
and today the word “sex” means biologically male or female.296
Asking what it means to discriminate because of sex, Judge Ho set forth out two
competing schools of thought: (1) the longstanding view that Title VII prohibits
employment discrimination favoring men over women, or vice versa, and (2) what
he characterized as the recently adopted view that the statute requires employer
blindness to an individual’s sex.297 He applied his schools of thought to a subject
having nothing to do with the case before the court: separate bathrooms for men and
women.298 Under his anti-favoritism approach, separate bathrooms are lawful

286. See Wittmer, 304 F. Supp. 3d at 634.
287. Id.
288. See Wittmer, 915 F.3d at 331. Taking no position on whether the district court’s order
should be affirmed or reversed, amici EEOC and other organizations asked the Fifth Circuit
to hold that transgender discrimination violates Title VII. See id.
289. See id. at 330.
290. 597 F.2d 936 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
291. Wittmer, 915 F.3d at 330.
292. 597 F.3d at 938.
293. On the difference between sexual orientation and transgender, see supra note 14 and
accompanying text; EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560, 575 (6th
Cir. 2018) (stating that sexual-orientation discrimination is not the same as transgender
discrimination); Jessica A. Clarke, They, Them, and Theirs, 132 HARV. L. REV. 894, 925
(2019) (“Gender identity is conceptually distinct from sexual orientation. Nonbinary people
have a diverse array of sexual orientations.”).
294. Wittmer, 915 F.3d at 333 (Ho, J. concurring).
295. Id.
296. Id. at 334.
297. See id.
298. Of all the topics available to illustrate the difference between the schools of thought
he presents, Judge Ho chose restrooms, the subject of a debate that “has engendered political
controversy over claims for recognition of the gender identities of transgender people who are
asking only to use the male or female facilities.” Clarke, supra note 293, at 981; see also id.
(“Because their gender identities may not accord with norms, the presence of a nonbinary
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because the privacy of both sexes is protected; under his blindness theory, separate
bathrooms are unlawful because they are not blind to sex. 299
Judge Ho’s schools of thought diverged on the issue of transgender and sexualorientation discrimination. Under the anti-favoritism theory, employer
discrimination against both transgender men and transgender women does not
discriminate on the basis of sex since men would not be favored over women, or vice
versa; rather, nontransgender persons would be favored over transgender persons.300
And discrimination against either gay men or lesbian women favors not men over
women, but straight men and women over gay men and lesbian women. By contrast,
he reasoned that under his blindness theory, Title VII would prohibit both
transgender and sexual-orientation discrimination as “it would not matter that the
company isn’t favoring men over women, or women over men. All that matters is
that company policy treats people differently based on their sex: Because only
women, not men, may identify as women—and only women, not men, may marry
men—just as only women, not men, may use women’s bathrooms.”301
Asking how should “a dutiful textualist” should proceed, Judge Ho declared that
“the traditional interpretation should prevail.”302 In 1964, there was no serious
contention that “the public meaning and understanding of Title VII included sexual
orientation or transgender discrimination,”303 and he argued that today’s judicial
consensus confirms that view. Distinguishing the original public meaning of Title
VII from the subjective intent of the legislators, he expressed his understanding that
those opposing the traditional view argue that members of the 1964 Congress would
not have expected that the statute would prohibit sexual harassment or same-sex
sexual harassment.304
But for originalists, the point is not whether members of Congress
subjectively intended that result—rather, the point is whether they should
have expected it, in light of the words of the statute as they were
generally understood at the time. In short, our lodestar is original public
meaning, not original intent.305
He argued, further, that no one should be surprised that Title VII, “drafted to
eradicate sex discrimination in the workplace,” would be interpreted by the Supreme
Court to prohibit sexual harassment.306 “That of course says nothing about whether
Title VII also forbids sexual orientation and transgender discrimination.” 307

person in either the men’s or women’s restroom may result in harassment or even violence.”).
299. Wittmer, 915 F.3d at 334 (Ho, J., concurring).
300. See id.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 334–35.
304. See id. at 335 n.1.
305. Id.
306. Id. But see Paul, supra note 86, at 346 (stating that “the members of . . . Congress
would have been quite surprised to learn” that sex discrimination included sexual harassment).
307. Wittmer, 915 F.3d at 335 (Ho, J., concurring).
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Judge Ho labels his approach as original public meaning originalism, the current
predominant approach among originalist academics and judges.308 But his focus on
what members of Congress should have expected in 1964 is actually a different
variant of originalism—original expected applications originalism. The original
public meaning of a text “is one thing; expectations about how the text will or should
be applied to particular cases or issues is another.”309 Regarding his argument that no
one should be surprised by the Supreme Court’s holding that sexual harassment is
sex discrimination, Judge Ho may be surprised that his own approach can yield an
interpretation resulting in the recognition of anti-LGBTQ discrimination claims. The
(his) traditional view of “sex” as male or female is also the view of “sex” in the
court’s sexual harassment decisions310 and in the recent appeals courts’ decisions
holding that anti-LGBTQ claims are actionable. This raises the obvious question of
why the sex-as-biology construction of that statute should not also govern in the antiLGBTQ discrimination context.311
Turning to Price Waterhouse and echoing Judge Sykes’s Hively dissent, Judge
Ho identified what he perceived to be a problem with the court’s sex stereotyping
analysis: Price Waterhouse did not make sex stereotyping a per se violation of Title
VII as Justice Brennan’s plurality opinion spoke only of prohibiting the “disparate
treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.”312 It is true that Justice
Brennan’s plurality opinion in Price Waterhouse did not expressly state that sex
stereotyping is a per se violation of Title VII. He made clear, however, that while
stereotypical workplace remarks do not inevitably establish that gender played a part
in an employment decision, such remarks could be evidence that gender did in fact
play a part.313 And Judge Ho’s observation that Justice Brennan was only speaking
of disparate treatment resulting from sex stereotypes simply restates what Justice
Brennan said in Price Waterhouse. Recall that Justice Brennan instructed that the
question to be answered on remand was the but-for, disparate-treatment inquiry:
would Ann Hopkins have been criticized as sharply or at all if she had been a man? 314
Given the Justice’s clearly stated view that sex stereotyping can be evidence of

308. See Heidi Kitrosser, Interpretive Modesty, 104 GEO. L.J. 459, 473 (2016).
309. Lawrence B. Solum, Triangulating Public Meaning: Corpus Linguistics, Immersion,
and the Constitutional Record, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1621, 1637 (2017).
310. See supra Section I.B.
311. See Joanna L. Grossman & Grant Hayden, Holy Dictum: Federal Judge Rejects
Protection Against Transgender Discrimination in “Elegant Aside,” JUSTIA VERDICT (Feb.
26, 2019), https://verdict.justia.com/2019/02/26/holy-dictum-federal-judge-rejects
-protection-against-transgender-discrimination-in-elegant-aside
[https://perma.cc/9ZJPBFN5].
312. Wittmer, 915 F.3d at 339 (Ho, J., concurring) (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
490 U.S. 228, 251).
313. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
314. See supra note 124 and accompanying text; see also Lampley v. Mo. Comm’n on
Human Rights, 570 S.W.3d 16, 24 (Mo. 2019) (“Since Price Waterhouse, it is clear an
employer who discriminates against ‘women because, for instance, they do not wear dresses
or makeup, is engaging in sex discrimination because the discrimination would not occur but
for the victim’s sex.’”) (quoting Lewis v. Heartland Inns of Am., L.L.C., 591 F.3d 1033, 1040
(8th Cir. 2010)).
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disparate treatment discrimination, Judge Ho has curiously branded as problematic
something that is not.315
Having issued a concurring (bordering on advisory) opinion to his own majority
opinion, Judge Ho wrote that the case before him
does not simply concern sexual orientation and transgender
discrimination. It affects every American who uses the restroom at any
restaurant, buys clothes at any department store, or exercises at any gym.
What’s more, because federal statutes governing educational institutions
employ language indistinguishable from Title VII, this debate also
affects virtually every school, college, dormitory, athletic activity, and
locker room in America.316
This op-ed-like statement and the overreaching dicta and “elegant asides” 317 in Judge
Ho’s maximalist concurring opinion lays down a marker in the current and ongoing
debate over the legal protections afforded or not provided to LGBTQ persons in and
beyond the workplace.
***
The contrast between R.G. & G.R. Funeral Homes and Judge Ho’s concurring
Wittmer opinion could not be starker. Judge Moore, guided by the Supreme Court’s
Price Waterhouse decision and Sixth Circuit precedent, persuasively established that
transgender discrimination constitutes gender nonconformity discrimination and sex
stereotyping that would not have occurred but for the employee’s sex. That the

315. Judge Ho also quoted the following sentence from Justice O’Connor’s statement in
her Price Waterhouse concurrence: “What is required . . . is direct evidence that
decisionmakers placed substantial negative reliance on an illegitimate criterion in reaching
their decision.” Whittmer, 915 F.3d at 339 (Ho, J., concurring). His opinion fails to note that
in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 91 (2003), the Court held that direct evidence is
not required in order to prove employment discrimination in a mixed-motives case. Nor does
he indicate that Justice O’Connor’s position—that a plaintiff must demonstrate that an
illegitimate factor played a substantial role in the employment decision—was legislatively
overruled by the Civil Rights Act of 1991’s requirement that a plaintiff prove that an unlawful
reason was a motivating (not a substantial) factor in the challenged employment decision. See
supra note 132 and accompanying text.
316. Id. at 337–38; see also id. at 341 (arguing that the people will lose confidence when
courts surprise them “with rulings that bear no resemblance to our common language” set forth
in legislation and expressing his concern that “the people are losing faith in their institutions—
and that our courts are giving the people reason to do so”).
317. Judge Patrick E. Higginbotham concurred in the dismissal of Wittmer’s claim. He
pointed out that Blum was decided decades before Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003),
wherein the Court struck down laws criminalizing same-sex sexual conduct, and that after
Lawrence the Fifth Circuit has not relied on Blum. See Wittmer, 915 F.3d at 333
(Higginbotham, J., concurring). As neither party questioned that Blum was binding precedent,
Judge Higginbotham thought that the court wisely did not “reach here to resolve Blum’s
endurance or the question of whether Title VII today proscribes discrimination against
someone because of sexual orientation or transgender status. We do not because we cannot,
even with elegant asides.” Id.
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drafters of Title VII did not foresee that the statute’s “because of sex” provision
would cover transgender discrimination was neither here nor there given post-1964
developments including Price Waterhouse and Oncale.318
Judge Ho’s Wittmer concurrence gave primacy of place to his understanding of
the original public meaning of the statutory text. As previously noted, he actually
applied a different form of originalism—original expected applications—in
suggesting that in 1964 members of Congress should have expected that Title VII’s
words would be later interpreted to prohibit sexual harassment. In addition, his effort
to problematize Price Waterhouse’s sex stereotyping analysis is, for reasons earlier
noted, unpersuasive and unavailing. 319
CONCLUSION
In 1964, gays and lesbians “were, literally, considered psychopaths, criminals,
and enemies of the people” and “presumptive felons”;320 it is thus not surprising that
the 88th Congress did not mean to protect them from discrimination in employment.
Fortunately, those mid-1960s views “no longer enjoy respectable support,”321 a
consequence of “profound changes within society—the constitutionalization of
privacy rights, the Civil Rights Movement, the women’s rights movement, the
LGBTQ rights movement, and the racial and gender integration of most workplaces
and institutions,”322 and the Supreme Court’s recognition of the constitutional right
to marry a person of the same sex in Obergefell v. Hodges.323
Obergefell “creates a paradoxical legal landscape in which a person can be
married on Saturday and then fired on Monday for just that act.”324 That paradox
would be eliminated by an affirmative answer to the question posed in this Article:
Is anti-LGBTQ discrimination prohibited by Title VII’s discrimination “because of
sex” proscription? Yes. That answer best comports with the text of Title VII’s sex
discrimination provision as construed over the years by the Supreme Court and more
recently by Hively, Zarda, and R.G. & G.R. Funeral Homes, and is the product of a
jurisprudential approach that does not render invisible or irrelevant more than a halfcentury of significant legal developments in Title VII law and policy. Anti-LGBTQ
discrimination is sex discrimination.

318. See supra notes 109–132 and accompanying text.
319. See supra notes 312–15 and accompanying text.
320. Eskridge, supra note 167, at 333, 336.
321. Id. at 336.
322. Melissa Murray, Consequential Sex: #MeToo, Masterpiece Cakeshop, and Private
Sexual Regulation, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 825, 853–54 (2019).
323. 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015).
324. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 342 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc)
(quoting Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 830 F.3d 698, 714 (7th Cir. 2016)).

